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Mass incarceration or overincarceration has gained significant attention over the last two 
decades, and criminal justice reform seeks to address it. This study uses constructivist 
grounded theory to examine the implementation of criminal justice reform legislation in 
Mississippi. Mississippi was chosen as the study setting because the state has been 
recognized as a national leader in enacting reform legislation and it has one of the 
nation’s highest incarceration rates. It is well established that policy implementation 
affects outcomes. Therefore, if the policies Mississippi is implementing are effective and 
they are implemented correctly, it stands to reason the state could benefit substantially 
from successful implementation. In other words, implementation should very much 
matter in Mississippi. The purpose of this dissertation was to build a set of theories that 
identify and explain obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform. The 
researcher applied Charmaz’s (2014) constructivist grounded theory to do so, and the 
result was seven theories that best explained the primary obstacles to the implementation 
of reform legislation in Mississippi. These seven theories were: 1) failure to convince, (2) 
failure to hit targets, (3) failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language, (4) failure to 
make data accessible, (5) failure to reinvest, (6) failure to make programs affordable, and 
(7) failure to address pre-trial problems. Failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language 
was identified as the one theory that best explained, overall, blockades to implementation 
in Mississippi. These theories should be transferrable to other jurisdictions. 
Keywords: Criminal justice reform; grounded theory; constructivist grounded 
theory; mass incarceration; overincarceration; over-incarceration; implementation 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
There is an oft-repeated phrase that the United States has five percent of the 
world’s population but 25 percent of its prisoners (Loury, 2008; Ye Hee Lee, 2015). The 
raw size of its incarcerated population exceeds every other nation in the world except 
perhaps China, whose estimated incarcerated population ranges from approximately 
400,000 persons below the United States to approximately 200,000 persons above it 
(World Prison Brief, 2018; see also Cullen & Jonson, 2017; Gottschalk, 2015; Pfaff, 
2017). Its incarcerate rate, which is the rate at which persons are incarcerated per 
population, far exceeds other liberal democracies (Pfaff, 2018; Wagner & Sawyer, 2018; 
Wagner & Walsh, 2016). For example, as shown in Figure 1, its 2016 incarceration rate 
of 698 persons per 100,000 in jails or prisons was substantially higher than the United 
Kingdom, which was the NATO nation with the closest rate at 139 such persons per 
100,000 (Wagner & Sawyer, 2018). The difference between the United States and United 
Kingdom was a difference of 559 persons per 100,000, and when extrapolated across 
10,000,000 persons in a sample population, it was a difference of 55,000 persons. These 
differences become larger when comparing the United States to the other NATO nations 
such as neighboring Canada with a rate of 114, France with 102, and Iceland with the 
lowest at 38. The U.S. rate arguably surpasses advanced autocracies and totalitarian 
states, but transparency issues with those nations make their data less reliable and that 




Figure 1. U.S. incarceration rate versus NATO countries. 
Note. The rates were obtained from Wagner and Sawyer (2018), who calculated the rates based on data 
from the World Prison Brief from the Institute for Criminal Policy Research. 
 
The Sentencing Project has estimated that even assuming a 1.8% decline in the 
U.S. prison population per year, it would take until 2101 for the population to return to 
1980 levels when there were 315,964 prisoners and our rate and population were more 
comparable to other nations (Gottschalk, 2015). The amount of work that will be required 
to reduce the incarceration rate and prison population raises an initial question: is this a 
problem worth addressing? (Alexander, 2010; Garland, 2001; Gottschalk, 2015; Pfaff, 
2017; Weiss & MacKenzie, 2010). Yes, for economic reasons and, when 
overincarceration occurs, moral ones. Corrections costs have ballooned over the last 
several decades, claiming an ever-increasing number of tax revenues (Cullen & Jonson, 
2017; Gottschalk, 2015). For example, from 1979/1980 – 2012/2013, state and local 
corrections expenditures increased by 324%, from $17 to $71 billion (Brown & Douglas-
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3 
are dismissive of this financial concern on the grounds these amounts constitute a small 
percentage of state budgets, but this line of thinking is how “[a] billion here, a billion 
there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money” becomes a reality (U.S. Senate 
Historical Office, 2020). These are real dollars that could be dedicated to other 
worthwhile public investments or savings to taxpayers. In addition to economic 
considerations, moral ones are implicated as well (Alexander, 2010; Gottschalk, 2015). 
These are essentially arguments that the fabric of communities and families are torn apart 
when persons are incarcerated and that we are currently overincarcerating. Imprisonment 
generally leaves damage in its wake to parties who did no wrong, such as spouses and 
children who are left behind. This can have drastic effects on those who now no longer 
have a father, mother, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, etc. to be present in their lives. 
Therefore, if society is overincarcerating beyond the amount necessary to serve public 
safety and the functions of the criminal justice system, incarceration becomes a problem. 
This is a potential cost to these persons and society that should be considered. 
Criminal justice reform largely assumes mass incarceration is a problem and 
seeks to address it (Garduque, 2018; Mauer, 2011; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016; Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2018a; Schoenfeld, 2012). Over approximately the past two decades, 
criminal justice reform legislation and policies have been enacted at the local, state, and 
federal levels (Cadora, 2014, Mauer, 2011). All of these efforts have sought in some way 
to reduce incarceration levels, and more legislation continues to be proposed, debated, 
and enacted today. These efforts address a mix of front-end reforms, such as sentencing 
reduction, and back-end reforms, such as recidivism reduction, parole changes, and 
reentry assistance (Mauer, 2011).  
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Efforts to reform criminal justice began at about the same time as evidence-based 
practices were being adopted numerous fields, including criminal justice. (Garduque, 
2018; Mauer, 2011; National Institute of Corrections, 2009; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016; 
Schoenfeld, 2012). Evidence-based practices expressly involve the application of 
scientific principles to public policy (Miller & Miller, 2015). Typically, a policy or 
program is “evidence-based” only after rigorous examination and successful replication, 
meaning that the program has been successfully implemented in at least one location 
other than the site of the original study (Baron, 2018; Cullen & Jonson, 2017; Miller & 
Miller, 2015). As a result of criminal justice reform and evidence-based practices rising 
in popularity at about the same time, many state-level criminal justice reform packages 
are based at least in part on evidence-based practices (Mauer, 2011, Pew Charitable 
Trusts, 2017a).  
Criminal justice reform must be implemented in a “criminal justice system” or 
apparatus that is vast and complex. Reform generally must be implemented across and 
within the numerous government entities, including state-level departments of 
corrections, local law enforcement agencies, state prisons, local jails, courts, juvenile 
courts and detention facilities, and private contractors (Smith et al., 2012; Mears, 2010). 
Problems arise. Legislators cannot foresee every contingency that will be faced by those 
charged with implementing legislation. Additionally, those charged with implementing 
legislation do not always share the same values as those enacting it (Lipsky, 1980; 
Persson & Goldkuh, 2010; Rothstein, 2003). 
Traditional bureaucracies are thought to exhibit hierarchical lines of authority and 
rigid rule application (Boyne, 2002; Pandey & Wright, 2006; Wright & Pandey, 2010; 
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Wright, 2004). Although many public agencies today maintain many of these 
characteristics, they are often not as bureaucratic as is commonly believed and civil 
servants and street-level bureaucrats may exercise discretion and serve as a filter between 
legislation and its implementation (Smith et al., 2012). Even in agencies where upper-
level management adopts criminal justice reform as a priority agenda item, there may be 
limits to the ability of the leadership to change the attitudes and beliefs of those who 
disagree with reform but are charged with its implementation (Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-
Moody and Musheno, 2003). This, in turn, can negatively affect implementation. 
It is well-established that policy implementation affects outcomes (Durlak & 
Dupree, 2008; Duwe & Clark, 2015; Gresham et al., 1993). Because of this, it can 
reasonably be stated that criminal justice reform cannot reach its full level of 
effectiveness if it is not implemented correctly (Lipsey, 1999; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003, 
Miller & Miller, 2015; Zajac, 2015; Wilson & Lipsey, 2000). Implementation of state-
level criminal justice reform is particularly important because approximately 87% of 
incarcerated persons are held in state systems (Pfaff, 2017). This means that state-level 
reforms have the most potential to impact the size of the overall prison population 
(Cadora, 2014; Campbell et al., 2015; Hagan, 2010; Pfaff, 2017; Prison Policy Initiative, 
2019). 
Problem Statement 
Implementation problems are common with criminal justice legislation (Mears, 
2010; Smith et al., 2012). Identifying the source of these problems is difficult because 
implementation often occurs in a “black box” (see also Duwe & Clark, 2015, Latessa, 
2018; Zajac, 2015). That is, there is an information vacuum because we cannot see the 
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process as it unfolds. Activities occur within the box, but they cannot be seen by the 
outside observer. This leads to a situation where even though the existence of some type 
of implementation problem can often be inferred through identification of a failed policy, 
identifying the precise source of a problem can be challenging if not impossible.  
While outcome evaluations are common and scholarship about “what works” in 
criminal justice is fairly well-developed, implementation evaluations have been 
conducted with far less frequency (Petersilia, 2008; Lin, 2012). This has resulted in 
implementation scholarship that is unclear, and there does not yet appear to be a broad 
consensus about the factors that lead to successful implementation or serve as an obstacle 
to it (Latessa, 2018; Mears, 2010).  
The criminal justice implementation evaluations that do exist provide frameworks 
for research such as this (Duwe & Clark, 2015; Ellickson and Petersilia, 1983; 
Greenwood & Welsh, 2012; Smith et al., 2012). These studies generally seek to identify 
factors that lead to successful implementation, as opposed to identifying obstacles, but 
the obstacles that have been identified include a lack of financial resources, lack of 
stakeholder buy-in, staff resistance to change, policy complexity, political and 
community resistance, and inadequate time or infrastructure (Bishop, 2012; Greenwood 
& Welsh, 2012; Lipsey & Howell, 2012; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003; Smith et al., 2012). 
These studies have generally used the case study method, and important to the present 
research, a study has not been found that used the grounded theory approach to construct 
a theory or theories about obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform. This 
dissertation does just that: it uses the grounded theory approach to qualitative research to 




Mississippi was an ideal location in which to undertake this study. Mississippi has 
one of the highest incarceration rates in the nation that has one of the highest 
incarceration rates in the world (Prison Policy Initiative, 2019). At the same time, the 
state has been recognized as a leader in criminal justice reform and the development of 
evidence-based practices (Leins, 2019; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2017a). In 2012, 
Mississippi joined the Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative. This initiative seeks to 
incorporate evidence-based practices into state-level policymaking in all fifty states (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2017b). In 2014, the State Legislature passed the first criminal justice 
reform measures with House Bills 585 and 906. When discussing criminal justice reform 
in Mississippi, House Bill 585 is the foundational bill. In short, House Bill 585 reduced 
mandatory time for many offenses and expanded judicial discretion to use alternative 
sentencing schemes, such as drug courts (Gelb & Pheiffer, 2018; Wright, 2014). House 
Bill 906 dismantled the “regimented inmate discipline” (RID) program, which was a 
paramilitary-style training program modeled after similar programs popular around the 
country in the 1980s through the early 2000s, and called for an evidence-based program 
to take its place (Blakinger, 2019; Dreher, 2016). Legislative reform efforts continued 
after 2014 with the passage of House Bill 387 in 2018, House Bill 1352 and Senate Bill 
2781 in 2018, and Senate Bill 2795 in 2021. Collectively, these measures following 
House Bill 585 are directed towards incarceration for the inability to pay court fees or 
bail (relevant to an issue known as “debtors’ prisons”); the increased use of alternative 
sentencing and specialist courts such as drug courts, mental health courts, and veterans 
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courts; changes to probation and parole; and occupational licensing issues, among others 
(Gates, 2018; Gelb & Pheiffer, 2018; Robertson, 2019).  
The size of Mississippi’s prison population has declined since it began adopting 
these reform measures, providing a correlation (but not necessarily causation) between 
reform measures and declining populations. Data published by the Mississippi 
Department of Corrections (MDOC) reflects that in January of 2014, the year in which 
the first criminal justice reform measures were enacted, the inmate custody population 
numbered 22,008. By January of 2020, the number was 18,971, a reduction of over 3,000 
inmates (Mississippi Department of Corrections, 2020).  
Prison populations are expensive and detract from other public investments or 
savings to taxpayers. In the case of Mississippi, total appropriations to MDOC have 
increased over time. From 2011 to 2020, allocations to MDOC increased from 
$328,771,055 to $338,384,557. The increase from 2011 to 2015 was particularly 
pronounced, when allocations reached a high of $367,051,342. There has been a general 
decline in allocations from 2015 until 2020, the same time span during which the first 
criminal justice reform measures were enacted and prison populations began to decline, 
but it is unknown whether these decreases were tied to actual savings resulting from 
reform or simply reflected forced legislative budget cuts.  
In addition to the financial cost, there is also the non-economic, human side of the 
equation to consider. Seven percent of Mississippi children – 55,000 kids – have had a 
parent in prison (Frazier, 2020). Research indicates the incarceration of a parent is 
damaging to a young person’s education, health, and social well-being, and can be more 
traumatic than death or divorce (Sparks, 2015). Reducing the number of innocently 
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affected children impacts their futures and how they develop as citizens. For these 
reasons, both the economic and the non-economic, reform in this state can make a 
substantial difference, and it makes the state an attractive location to examine whether 
criminal justice reform has been implemented as advertised. 
Purpose Statement 
If implemented correctly, criminal justice reform measures have the potential to 
save tax dollars and positively impact lives and communities. Part of ensuring that reform 
measures are implemented correctly is determining whether obstacles exist, and if so, 
identifying what they are and how and why they exist. Only then can the obstacles be 
addressed. The purpose of this study was to build a grounded theory or theories that 
identify and explain obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform (Creswell, 
2018; Charmaz, 2014, Kilbourn, 2006). These theories have the potential to educate 
decision-makers on the obstacles that need to be removed for full implementation to 
occur. To achieve the objective of this study, the researcher attempted to get inside the 
metaphorical black box of policy implementation by interviewing key players in state and 
local government who have had active roles in implementing Mississippi’s criminal 
justice reform measures and others who are knowledgeable about the process.
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
An implementation evaluation is a very specific type of policy analysis that is 
situated within a larger policy evaluation framework. Mears (2010) and Welsh and Harris 
(2016) offer two such frameworks that are for the specific purpose of evaluating criminal 
justice policy. Mears (2010) proposed a framework that he termed the “evaluation 
research framework,” and it consists of five hierarchical steps: (1) a needs assessment; (2) 
a theory evaluation; (3) an implementation evaluation, also called a process evaluation; 
(4) an outcome evaluation, also called an impact evaluation; and (5) a cost-efficiency 
evaluation, which consists of both cost-effective and cost-benefit evaluations. Welsh and 
Harris (2016) offered a framework similar to that offered by Mears, but suggested seven 
steps instead of five. The difference between the two is one more of form (i.e., how to 
articulate the number of steps) than of substance (i.e., how policy is examined).  
Each of the steps in Mears’ hierarchy or similar frameworks such as Welsh and 
Harris (2016) is important, yet distinct. To date, the focus in criminal justice literature has 
been on outcome analysis. An outcome analysis examines whether and how well a policy 
achieves its intended objective, and it is often referred to colloquially in the literature as 
“what works” (Fagan & Mihalic, 2003; Lin, 2012; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003; Miller & 
Miller, 2015; Smith et al., 2012).  
This focus on outcome analysis has produced considerable scholarship concerning 
“what works,” but much less attention has been paid to implementation analysis, which is 
the evaluative step that precedes an outcomes analysis. An implementation analysis is 
concerned with whether a policy is implemented as intended as opposed to whether it 
produced intended outcomes (Mears, 2010). It is sometimes referred to colloquially as 
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“how it works” (Fagan & Mihalic, 2003; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003; Miller & Miller, 2015; 
Smith et al., 2012) or making “‘what works’ work” (Andrews, 2006, p. 595). The most 
important objective of an implementation analysis is to ascertain program fidelity, also 
referred to as program integrity (Mears, 2010; Miller & Miller, 2015). Fidelity is a 
measurement of whether a treatment is delivered consistent with the intent and design of 
a policy or program (Durlak and DuPre, 2008; Mears, 2010, Miller & Miller, 2015). The 
growth of evidence-based policies and funding for them has placed a premium on the 
ability of researchers and practitioners to measure program fidelity because financing 
tends to flow to programs that are proven to work as advertised (Miller & Miller, 2015).  
More attention to implementation, “how it works” or making “‘what works’ 
work,” is needed for a number of reasons. One, implementation affects outcomes (Durlak 
& Dupree, 2008; Duwe & Clark, 2015; Gresham et al., 1993; Lipsey, 1999; Mihalic & 
Irwin, 2003; Miller & Miller, 2015; Zajac, 2015; Wilson & Lipsey, 2000). This is why 
some scholars suggest implementation evaluations must precede outcome evaluations in 
order to make reliable causal inferences (Duwe & Clark, 2015; Latessa, 2018; Miller & 
Miller, 2015). For example, undiscovered poor implementation can lead to Type 2 errors, 
which means an observer can conclude a program is not effective when it might have 
been, had it been implemented correctly (Latessa, 2018; Salisbury, 2015; Zajac, 2015). In 
this situation, the failure is a reflection of a poorly implemented policy, and not 
necessarily a bad policy (Miller & Miller, 2015). Stated slightly differently, it is not that 
the program “did not work,” but that it “did not happen” (Van Voorhis, Cullen, & 
Applegate, 1995, p. 20). Two, undiscovered poor implementation not only leads to 
incorrect conclusions about the effectiveness of the specific policy being examined, but it 
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also leads to negative conclusions about the effectiveness of policy generally and 
strengthens the “nothing works” mentality (Martinson, 1976; Zajac, 2015). Three, poor 
implementation negatively affects the recipients of a program because they do not receive 
the needed service or product (Latessa, 2018). For example, if legislation is drafted with 
the intention of providing a benefit to a particular group and only some of the group 
receives the benefit or some or all only partially receive the benefit, recipients are 
negatively affected. This is worthy of discovery in and of itself. Four, understanding 
implementation affects our ability to refine and improve policies and programs. Finally, 
and very importantly, even proven programs cannot be taken “off-the-shelf” and 
transported into different environments if we do not have a solid understanding of “how it 
works” or making “‘what works’ work” (Lin, 2012; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003). 
Implementation studies help close the gap between research as it exists in controlled 
settings and reality as it exists on-the-ground so that this can be done (Gottfredson & 
Gottfredson, 2002). Ultimately, this makes policy more useful and responsive to the 
problems it seeks to address.  
Implementation evaluations are difficult because implementation often occurs in a 
black box (Latessa, 2018; Mears, 2010; Zajac, 2015). Qualitative research methods can 
help peer into this box and therefore are particularly well-suited for this type of 
evaluation (Miller and Miller, 2015). Some scholars, such as Miller and Miller (2015), 
suggest the result of having too few qualitative researchers in criminology and criminal 
justice is the scarcity of implementation analyses within the fields. This has resulted in 
criminology and criminal justice frequently having to borrow implementation scholarship 
from other disciplines. Miller and Miller (2015) also critique the implementation studies 
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that do exist within the fields but do not use qualitative methods, such as Duwe and Clark 
(2015). Their overarching point is that some implementation failures are incapable of 
discovery or are at least less likely to be discovered unless qualitative methods are used.  
Previous policy evaluations have sought to identify factors relevant to successful 
implementation in a variety of contexts. Particularly instructive is Ellickson and Petersilia 
(1983), which was specifically in the criminal justice context and whose findings have 
served as a foundation for other implementation studies in criminology, criminal justice, 
and other fields (Smith et al., 2012). They used the case study method to examine the 
implementation of 37 policy innovations across five states and eight counties. They 
defined policy “innovations” as programs or practices that were new to an adopting 
agency, and the innovations studied included nine victim or witness programs, 10 
computer-assisted applications, eight targeted programs, and 10 offender programs.   
Ellickson and Petersilia (1983, p. 22-23) termed their key findings “the six 
correlates of successful implementation”: (1) an agency’s motivation at adoption (as 
measured by whether the policy was initiated locally, dictated to the agency, or some mix 
of the two); (2) top leadership support, director and staff commitment, and, if applicable, 
external cooperation; (3) staff competence; (4) benefits that outweigh costs; (5) clarity of 
goals and procedures; and (6) clear lines of authority. The researchers viewed 
implementation as a process, and all of these correlates are dynamic except the first, 
which is static and measured by whatever it was at the time of adoption.  
Strategies were also identified that can be used to influence the six correlates 
(Ellickson & Petersilia, 1983). These include providing benefits to those implementing 
the policy (a particularly important strategy in criminal justice where innovations rely on 
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input from multiple organizations); involving key actors in planning and problem 
solving; a flexible problem-solving process; phased implementation to build on prior 
achievements; craft-learning to enhance staff competence (learning lessons from active, 
local implementation of an innovation and disseminating lessons to employees); 
continual planning; and regular communication. Finally, they identified three obstacles to 
avoid: (1) symbolic participation of actors in the planning process or open-ended 
participation, by which they refer to an unnecessarily prolonged planning period without 
clear goals and an abdication of responsibility by top leadership; (2) a division of 
authority; and (3) premature certainty and inflexibility injected into a policy.  
While Ellickson and Petersilia’s (1983) analyzed the implementation of policy 
innovations in criminal justice agencies, other researchers have examined the 
implementation of school-based programs aimed at reducing behavioral problems such as 
violence, substance abuse, and criminal activity generally (Fagan and Mihalic, 2003; 
Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 2002). For example, Gottfredson and Gottfredson (2002) 
identified four potential obstacles to the implementation of policy innovations when 
examining 3,691 school-based programs: (1) organizational capacity; (2) organizational 
support (training, supervision, principal support), (3) program features (manuals, 
implementation standards, quality-control), and (4) integration into normal operations, 
local initiation, and local planning. Similarly, Fagan and Mihalic (2003) evaluated the 
implementation of Life Skills Training (LST), a three-year drug prevention program, 
across 70 sites consisting of 292 participating schools and approximately 130,000 
students. The LST was selected for analysis because of its inclusion in the Blueprints for 
Violence Prevention Initiative, a series of 11 programs that have been subject to rigorous 
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testing, demonstrated significant reductions in violence, and identified by U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention as suitable 
for replication (see also Elliot & Mihalic, 2004, for a description of the initiative). The 
most commonly identified obstacle to implementation was teachers not wanting to reduce 
time that had historically been dedicated to core studies. This reflected a lack of buy-in 
from the very persons responsible for implementing the program, a factor that is 
commonly found to be important in the literature. Other obstacles included a lack of 
support from some management, administrators, program coordinators, and instructors; 
lack of instructor training; problems integrating a program into a site infrastructure; and 
instructor turnover, a problem that can overlap with instructor training.   
Mihalic, Fagan, and Argamaso (2008) built upon Fagan and Mihalic (2003) when 
also examining the LST program over the life course of the three-year program at 105 
different sites involving 432 schools. Many of the obstacles they identified overlapped 
with those identified by Fagan and Mihalic (2003), such as integrating the new program 
into the existing schedule (and in particular resolving tension with the time needed for 
core classes); instructors not regularly attending all training workshops; student 
misbehavior; program coordinator commitment and authority; school principal and 
administrator support; and instructor support.  
Mental health research has also sought to identify factors relevant to policy 
implementation (Durlak & DuPre, 2008; Mancini et al., 2015; Nelson et al., 2013; Rapp 
et al., 2009). Durlak & Dupre (2008) identified two broad sets of factors which affect 
implementation and which they termed service delivery system factors and support 
system factors. Service delivery system factors include characteristics of the innovations, 
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organizational and community capacity, and service-provider qualities, whereas support 
system factors include training, technical assistance, and similar influences. While Durlak 
and Dupree (2008) identified and discussed these factors within the context of mental 
health programs for children, Nelson et al. (2013) discussed them in a study of a housing 
program designed to address homelessness and mental illness among adults and expressly 
noted their relevance in that specific arena. Similarly, Rapp (2009) found the most 
significant barriers to implementing evidence-based mental health policy included the 
behavior of front-line supervisors, front-line practitioners and others in the agency, and 
intra-agency synergy. Mancini et al. (2015) identified and categorized factors affecting 
implementation as either state-level facilitators and barriers or organization-level 
facilitators and barriers. State-level factors included the state mental health authority 
(which would be translatable in another context to an applicable government agency 
authority), financing, licensing process, and technical assistance or consultation. 
Organization-level factors included middle and upper management, team leadership, 
staffing, and change culture.  
Stepping back from the more specific settings of schools or mental health and 
looking at policy implementation at a broader level, Mihalic & Irwin (2003) examined 
implementation in multiple contexts. The researchers expressly sought to differentiate the 
study from Ellickson and Petersilia (1983), with its focus on law enforcement programs, 
and Gottfredson and Gottfredson (2002) and others, with their focus on school-based 
programs.  Mihalic & Irwin (2003) examined the implementation of eight Blueprints 
programs over two years at 42 different sites in the United States and across a wide range 
of treatments, including prenatal and postpartum care, school-based programming, 
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mentoring, family therapy, and foster care. The most important implementation factors 
they identified were teaching assistance quality, inconsistent staffing, community 
support, and program characteristics, such as quality of materials, time required, 
complexity, cost, and flexibility. The second most important factors identified included 
agency characteristics such as staff participation, communication, administrative support, 
clarity of goals, clear lines of authority, program champions, financial support, and 
political climate. Weaknesses in any of these areas would serve as an obstacle to policy 
implementation.  
Over the past decade, a number of criminal justice studies have examined the 
implementation of innovative policies. Smith et al. (2012) was a case study examining 
the Earned Discharge (ED) pilot program in California, which aimed to reduce the state’s 
incarcerated population by reducing the timeframe during which a low risk offender 
could be re-incarcerated for a technical violation while on supervision. ED sought to do 
this by reducing the parole time from one year to six months, but the policy was never 
implemented as intended and eligible participants were either not allowed to participate 
or, even if they were, frequently were not released from parole at the conclusion of six 
months. Smith et al. (2012) explained the implementation failure through a three-part 
typology of context, capacity, and content. Context involved lack of local political and 
law enforcement support, capacity involved a lack of leadership in the Division of Parole 
Operations (DAPO) and its inability to clearly communicate the goals of the ED program, 
and content involved confusion and disagreement among participating agencies about the 
content of the program itself (see also Campbell, 2012; Lin, 2012; & Schoenfeld, 2012) 
(discussing Smith et al., 2012). Similar content problems were encountered in California 
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when attempting to implement a legally mandated substance abuse treatment program for 
offenders, an experience studied by Wiley et al. (2004). There the treatment professionals 
responsible for implementing the program made assumptions about the types of offenders 
who would qualify for the program that conflicted with the assumptions made by judges, 
the very persons responsible for sending offenders into the program.  
Later in the same year as Smith et al. (2012), Greenwood and Walsh (2012) 
published a study which they claimed was the first to examine how states promoted and 
supported the use of evidence-based practices in the area of delinquency prevention. 
Although the primary goal for Greenwood & Walsh (2012) was to measure the progress 
of different states in adopting evidence-based practices, the researchers also identified 
four obstacles to implementation: (1) when local investment is required but the benefits 
accrue to the state; (2) when funding streams are already committed to other programs 
and some of them are not evidence-based; (3) the complexity of coordination and 
implementation; and (4) staff resistance to change (see also Bishop, 2012; Lipsey & 
Howell, 2012) (discussing Greenwood & Walsh, 2012). 
Contribution of this Dissertation 
The subject of this study is the implementation of legislation, and legislation 
leaves state and local officials with considerable discretion in promulgating and adopting 
policies and programs to carry out legislative intent (Keiser, 1999; Persson & Goldkuhl, 
2011; Riccucci, 2005). Unlike previous studies that used the case study method to 
describe implementation factors and problems, this study used the grounded theory 
approach and contributes a set of seven theories to inform future policymakers and 
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researchers. Through using grounded theory, it does so using first-hand knowledge from 
those in the field.   
The researcher used the implementation perspective as set forth in Ellickson and 
Petersilia (1983) and adopted by Smith et al. (2012). The implementation perspective 
focuses on events after adoption of a policy or program and the actions of persons who 
are responsible for implementation. Under this perspective, successful innovations rely 
on changes in the attitudes and behaviors of actors charged with implementation and 
ultimately make progress towards the stated goal. While Ellickson and Petersilia (1983) 
recognize a small minority of innovations are ready-made at the time of adoption, most 
are flexible and change can occur as circumstances require (Ellickson & Petersilia, 1983). 
This should be no surprise. Even with established programs there is an ongoing debate 
about the tension between fidelity, widely recognized as the most important indicator of 
implementation, and adaptability. (Durlak & DuPre, 2008; Moore, Bumbarger, & 
Cooper, 2013; Morrison et al., 2009).   
A competing perspective is the adoption perspective (Ellickson & Petersilia, 
1983). This perspective focuses on the development and dissemination of new ideas. 
According to this perspective, the key determinants of successful implementation are the 
characteristics of the innovation and dissemination process. Those who would implement 
policy are viewed passively, and the assumption is that good ideas are self-executing. 
Therefore, once knowledge about them is disseminated, good innovations will be 
implemented as a matter of course. The researcher assumed that criminal justice reform is 
not self-executing, as advanced by the adoption perspective, and therefore the post-




Based on the existing literature above, a central question to guide this research is 
posed along with several sub-questions: 
Central question: 
Are there obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform legislation?  
Research Sub-questions: 
1. What are the obstacles? 
2. How do these obstacles function?  
3. Why are they there?   







CHAPTER III  - METHODOLOGY 
Jock Young (2011) argued more theory is needed. The academic landscape, as he 
saw it, was filled with quantitative research and analysis, but there was a void of 
theoretical development to accompany these data driven inquiries. He created the visual 
of the “datasaurus” to represent this problem. The “datasaurus” was the body of a 
brontosaurus. The small head represents the paucity of theory in the field, and the 
enormous body represents the repeated quantitative analyses of these same theories, of 
which there are not enough, over and over and over again.  
The datasaur, Empiricus Abstractus, is a creature with a very small head, 
a long neck, a huge belly and a little tail. His head has only a smattering 
of theory, he knows that he must move constantly but is not sure where he 
is going, he rarely looks at any detail of the actual terrain on which he 
travels, his neck peers upwards as he moves from grant to grant, from 
database to database, his belly is huge and distended with the intricate 
intestine of regression analysis, he eats ravenously but rarely thinks about 
the actual process of statistical digestion, his tail is small, slight and 
inconclusive.  
(Young, 2011, p. 15) (italics in original). 
This dissertation seeks to be a part of the solution to that problem by offering a set 
of theories in the fields of criminal justice and criminology. Specifically, this dissertation 
created a set of theories about the phenomena that act as obstacles to the implementation 
of criminal justice reform. The following questions and sub-questions guided the 




Are there obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform legislation?  
Research Sub-questions: 
1. What are the obstacles? 
2. How do these obstacles function?  
3. Why are they there?   
4. Why are they allowed to persist? 
The hope is that these theories can provide guidance to policy makers in other 
states and the federal government should they be implementing their own reform 
agendas, and to academics and other public policy researchers wishing to further explore 
these topics in future studies. 
A Historical Review of the Qualitative Approach for Developing Theory 
The qualitative method of study was selected precisely because this method is 
well-suited to developing theory (Tewksbury, 2009; Tewksbury, Dabney, & Copes, 
2010). The methods used for qualitative analysis, such as interviews, often allow for a 
deeper exploration of a subject than quantitative research techniques (Charmaz, 2014; 
Creswell & Poth, 2018). This is, indeed, why qualitative approaches are sometimes 
coupled with quantitative approaches, e.g., they allow the researcher to fill information 
gaps left by quantitative instruments such as surveys (Harcourt, 2001; Mihalic, Fagan, 
and Argamaso, 2008). Additionally, one of the primary reasons qualitative studies are 
useful is because they give rise to the very theories that can later be tested using 
quantitative methods (Tewksbury, Dabney, & Copes, 2010; Worrall, 2000). 
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The different qualitative research approaches that can be adopted include 
ethnography, case study, narrative research, phenomenology, and grounded theory 
(Creswell & Poth, 2018). Grounded theory is used here because it allows the researcher 
to inductively and abductively (described below) construct a theory from data obtained 
from persons in the field through interviews. Such a theory is therefore said to be 
“grounded-in” (i.e., based on) the perspectives of the participants.  
Grounded Theory: Its Early History 
Grounded theory has intellectual foundations in the pragmatism and social 
constructivism of the University of Chicago and the positivism of Columbia University 
(Charmaz, 2014). It is a merging of these two worlds. Pragmatists are of the view that the 
value of a theory rests in its ability to be applied in a practical setting. They are also of 
the view that reality is subject to multiple interpretations and fluid. Early pragmatist 
scholars from the University of Chicago and others who influenced pragmatism include 
well-known names within academia such as Charles S. Peirce (1878/1958), George 
Hebert Mead (1932, 1934), and John Dewey (1919/1948, 1925/1958). Pragmatism 
provided the basis for symbolic interactionism, a term coined by Herbert Blumer, who 
was Mead’s intellectual heir, and it is a theoretical perspective that reality is subjective 
with no deep, underlying truth to be discovered. Instead, reality is constructed through 
our interactions and use of language. “Reality” changes over time and is dependent on the 
person being asked.  
In addition to the pragmatist and social constructivist underpinnings to grounded 
theory provided by the Chicago School, it also provided a foundation for qualitative 
methods through its use of life histories and cases studies in the early decades of the 
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1900s, and by the 1940s, participant observation (Charmaz, 2014). Problematically, while 
the Chicago School laid the groundwork for qualitative approaches through its use of life 
histories, case studies, and participant observation, the guidance scholars provided on 
precisely how to conduct this type of research was opaque, and absent from discussion 
was a precise articulation of field methods or any type of systematic approach.  
Positivism supplied the other key foundation to grounded theory and came from 
the influence of Columbia University (Charmaz, 2014). Positivism enjoyed an explosive 
growth in the twentieth century and stressed systematic observation, replicable 
experiments, confirmed evidence, and falsification. Importantly, positivism also assumed 
an unbiased and passive researcher who could separate facts from values – a point that 
will be challenged by many modern-day grounded theorists, as discussed below. It was 
generally accepted at the time that application of these tenants provided the only method 
by which information reliable enough to be considered scientific or semi-scientific could 
be discovered. Positivism was associated with quantitative research, and by the mid-
1900s, deductive quantitative research methods held complete dominance over inductive 
qualitative methods, which were frequently dismissed as anecdotal, biased, and 
unsystematic to such a degree as to render the research not reliable enough to be used as 
the basis for scientific inquiry. The result was a large imbalance between the number of 
quantitative analyses versus theory development, leading to Young’s (2011) datasaurus.  
It was against this backdrop that Glaser and Strauss introduced their book, The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory, in 1967. This text, prepared after Glaser and Strauss 
studied death and dying in hospitals in the early 1960s, codified the qualitative method 
for the first time (Charmaz, 2001). They wanted to develop theory from data as opposed 
 
25 
to deducing hypothesis from existing theories, and they believed codifying the qualitative 
method was the best way to go about this.  
Glaser had been trained at Columbia with its emphasis on positivism, and Strauss 
at Chicago with its emphasis on pragmatism (Charmaz, 2014). This is how these two 
orientations became merged in grounded theory (Charmaz, 2001). With Glaser’s 
background in quantitative research, he emphasized the scientific method, objectivity, the 
idea of the passive observer, replication, and the notion the truth is there, waiting to be 
discovered. He also emphasized middle-range theories. These are theories of social 
processes grounded in data, and they are distinct from the grand theories of mid-century 
sociology that lacked a basis in systematically analyzed data. Glaser’s analytical 
approach helped to codify steps for qualitative analysis, providing a template for other 
researchers.  
Strauss was influenced by the pragmatists’ philosophical traditions of the 
University of Chicago (Charmaz, 2001, 2014). He adopted symbolic interactionism and 
Chicago’s legacy of field research through the influence of Herbert Blumer and Robert 
Park while studying for his doctorate. Strauss argued people are active agents in their 
lives and not passive recipients of outside forces. He also argued that action was the 
central phenomenon to assess. According to his philosophy, it is process that is more 
important than structure because processes created structure, and not vice-versa. The 
meanings we apply to process and structures are subjective and social and we create the 
meanings through interactions and use of language. He was creative and free-thinking, 
and often engaged in a process he called “blue skying” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 10) in which 
he creatively imagined and teased-out linkages between concepts.  
 
26 
Although Charmaz (2014, 2017) notes it was not until 1978 in Theoretical 
Sensitivity that Glaser provided clarity to the precise steps involved in grounded theory, 
The Discovery of Grounded Theory nevertheless was a demarcation point for a shift in 
qualitative studies to a focus on methods. It is this shift that ultimately resulted in greater 
acceptance of the qualitative approach as producing information subject to a sufficient 
amount of scientific rigor and therefore reliable to a sufficient degree to contribute to 
scholarly debate. Charmaz described this development as “revolutionary” (Charmaz, 
2014, p. 7). According to Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Glaser (1978), grounded theory 
has several key components including the simultaneous collection and analysis of data, 
approaching analysis without preconceived codes and categories, constructing codes and 
categories from data and not preconceived notions, the constant comparative method of 
constantly comparing data, codes and themes, advancing theory development at every 
step, writing memoranda to generate and synthesize ideas, and theoretical sampling for 
theory construction. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) – the same Strauss who had been partnered with Glaser 
– then introduced another version of grounded theory in Basics of qualitative research: 
Grounded theory procedures and techniques. Although this text served as an official 
break between the approaches of Strauss and Glaser, doctoral students studying under 
both have reported observing a growing divide between the two years before the actual 
publication of the book in 1990 (Charmaz, 2014). Strauss and Corbin emphasized 
technical and systematic procedures instead of more flexible procedures that arguably 
permit categories to emerge from the data (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). Glaser (1992) critiqued Strauss and Corbin’s approach as too systematic and as a 
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result forces data and analysis into preconceived categories (Charmaz, 2014). It is ironic 
that Glaser, the positivist influenced scholar from Columbia whose analytical skills 
contributed to the coding scheme of grounded theory, criticized Strauss, the pragmatist 
scholar from Chicago who engaged in “blue-skying,” of ultimately adopting an approach 
that is too structured. The Strauss and Corbin (1990) approach is mentioned only briefly 
here to provide the reader with information about this version of grounded theory even 
though it is not the version of grounded theory used in this study.  
The Development of Constructivist Grounded Theory 
In the wake of Strauss and Corbin’s 1990 publication, a number of grounded 
theorists began to alter the approach yet again, this time away from the positivism 
emphasized by Glaser as well Strauss and Corbin (Charmaz, 2014). Charmaz termed the 
new approach that was developed “Constructivist Grounded Theory” (p. 14), and this is 
the approach used for this dissertation. Lest this description of a move to a constructivist 
approach and away from an emphasis on positivism be misleading as to how far scholars 
ventured from earlier iterations of the theory, constructivist grounded theory adopted 
Glaser & Strauss’s (1967) “original statement” (p. 12). This included an open-ended and 
iterative approach that uses constant comparative methods (comparing data to data and 
data to codes and codes to codes and codes to categories and categories to categories, 
etc.) and inductive reasoning to identify emergent themes.  
A marked difference between constructivist grounded theory and earlier versions 
of the approach is that it emphasizes flexibility (Charmaz, 2014; Creswell & Poth, 2018). 
Additionally, constructivist grounded theorists make different assumptions than 
researchers using the Glaser and Strauss (1967) approach. Constructivist grounded 
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theorists recognize and acknowledge the inherent bias of any researcher and reject the 
idea of a completely neutral and value-free observer (Charmaz, 2001). They argue, 
instead, that the researcher records the world as the researcher best sees it, but not 
necessarily as a reflection of an underlying truth that has mystically arisen with the data 
and would be discovered regardless of who the researcher is. In fact, they argue the 
researcher will directly impact the data that is discovered and therefore the ultimate 
“truth” that is discovered from it. Different researcher, different data, different theory – 
this is a possibility recognized by the constructivist grounded theorist. In fact, Charmaz 
coined the “Constructivist Grounded Theory” and used “constructivist” “to acknowledge 
subjectivity and the researcher’s involvement in the construction and interpretation of 
data” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 14). She advocated for an emphasis on the pragmatist roots of 
grounded theory, and argued that finished theories are constructions of reality rather than 
an exact reflection of it. 
Although the reasoning used in constructivist grounded theory is frequently 
termed inductive – and that is accurate – it also uses a lesser-known form of reasoning 
termed “abductive reasoning.” Abductive reasoning involves identifying the most 
plausible theoretical explanation from data by testing different possible explanations 
(Charmaz, 2017; Reichertz, J., 2009; Richardson, R., & Kramer, E. H., 2006). This 
requires moving back and forth between the data and possible theoretical explanations.   
Charmaz’s (2014) version of constructivist grounded theory emphasizes 
approaching the data without preconceived ideas and staying close to the data. Keeping in 
mind the process from beginning to end of a project is iterative and not linear, Charmaz 
recommends a process that moves from initially coding the data to focused coding to 
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theory construction. Creating memoranda, i.e., “memoing,” to analyze data, codes, and 
connections between and among them is the key part of the analysis that leads to 
developing and constructing theory. Although memoing could be placed on a process 
timeline between focused coding and theory construction, it is in actuality a process that 
should be employed throughout the data collection and analysis process. Figure 2 
provides a visual of the process as described by Charmaz (2014, p. 133) (crediting 
Allison Tweed for constructing figure for Tweed and Charmaz, 2001, p. 133). 
Figure 2. A visual representation of grounded theory. 
 
Explaining these steps in more detail, the first step in coding under the 
constructivist approach is initial coding. Initial codes should hew closely to the data, 
which may call for line-by-line coding. Charmaz (2014) recommends this occur quickly 
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and somewhat spontaneously, and that the researcher code as much as possible in order to 
leave all possible doors open for inquiry. Focused codes are a level of abstraction above 
initial codes. This involves identifying the themes and concepts that are suggested by the 
codes and the data on which the codes are based. Charmaz recommends looking for latent 
themes as well as express ones, and she describes this as an emergent process. It is often 
the case that initial codes become focused codes because of their significance and 
theoretical reach, and it is a misconception that a code must occur repeatedly in order to 
be emergent: “Not at all. If the code is telling, use it.” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 145). This 
process of focused coding can also allow the researcher to discard with those codes that 
are off-point to the emerging, strongest themes. Memoing is a process that engages the 
researcher in analyzing the data and codes, and in so doing permits the researcher to 
make connections and develop theoretical categories. There is no mechanical formula for 
how a memo should be prepared. It is simply a process that permits the flow and creation 
of ideas about the project.  
Constructivist Grounded Theory as Applied to this Dissertation 
Data Collection 
 The research setting was Mississippi. Mississippi was selected as an ideal 
location for this research because it has been identified by Pew Charitable Trusts and 
others as a leader in enacting criminal justice reform measures, and therefore the results 
of this study should be informative to other researchers and policymakers implementing 
reform in other jurisdictions (Leins, 2019; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2017a).  
Data collection occurred primarily through interviews, although some participants 
provided documentary evidence that was consulted when reviewing transcripts and 
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preparing memoranda. For interviews, purposive sampling was used in order to identify 
potential participants who were most likely to have relevant information (Charmaz, 2014; 
Creswell & Poth, 2018). The potential participants identified included state legislators, 
judges, prosecutors, public defenders, law enforcement, think tank policy analysts, public 
policy non-profit members, state-wide policy group members, and a former inmate. The 
persons who ultimately participated came from all of these categories and from all 
geographic parts of the state. In many interviews, snowball sampling was also used to 
identify additional persons who might have relevant information or to follow a particular 
lead or line of thought provided by a participant.  
All participants were required to sign a consent form before the interview. This 
research began during the Covid-19 pandemic, and consistent with University protocol 
then in-existence for human subjects research, all interviews were conducted via Zoom. 
The interviews were recorded so that a transcript could be prepared. Only the researcher 
had access to the recordings and the transcripts and they were kept in a secure location in 
order to protect confidentiality. This research was approved by the Institutional Review 
Board (Appendix A).  
Charmaz (2014) is of the view that there is no minimum number of persons who 
must be interviewed in order to have a reliable grounded theory. Rather, the researcher 
should continue the process of interviewing more and more persons until the data reaches 
a “saturation point,” which is when new data no longer inspires new thoughts or 
connections relevant to the inquiry. As discussed by Charmaz (2014) and others, there is 
no bright-line test for when this point is reached, and it depends upon the good faith 
exercise of judgment by the researcher.  
 
32 
Thirty persons were invited by email to participate in an interview, and 19 agreed. 
One of the persons who agreed to an interview had to later cancel, with apologies, for 
fear that participation would result in answers that would jeopardize the person’s 
employment. The first interview occurred on October 2, 2020, and the last on May 14, 
2021. With 18 persons ultimately being interviewed, this resulted in a participation rate 
of 60%. The interviews lasted an average of 52 minutes with the shortest at 20 minutes 
and the longest at an hour and 39 minutes. Consistent with grounded theory, open-ended 
questions were used, and the researcher used a 10-question interview guide to provide 
structure to the process (Tewksbury, 2013). The guide can be seen at Appendix B. 
Attempts were made to elicit information in a way that would inform theory construction 
without coaching by the researcher (Schein, 1999).  
The 18 participants can be grouped into five categories: policymakers, defenders, 
judges and administrators, prosecutors, and inmates. Some of the participants qualified 
for more than one category, and this is reflected in Table 1.  
Table 1 Participants by group categorization  
Type of Interviewee Number Percentage 
Defenders 7 39% 
Policymakers 7 39% 
Judges & Administrators 5 28% 
Prosecutors 4 20% 
Inmates 1 5% 
 
There were seven policymakers, and they consisted of think tank and interest 
group representatives, members of policymaking criminal justice groups or committees, 
and a state legislator. There were also seven defenders, and they consisted of current and 
former assistant and head public defenders. There were five judges and administrators, 
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and they consisted of current and former judges and persons who served in administrative 
capacities of some aspect of a program that is part of criminal justice reform. There were 
four current or former prosecutors, and they were assistant district attorneys in various 
parts of the state. There was one inmate, and he was housed at the Mississippi State 
Penitentiary, known as Parchman Farm or Parchman. 
Data Analysis 
Although the constructivist approach to grounded theory is iterative, it still 
loosely follows certain steps in an analysis process, beginning with data collection. 
Unlike other approaches where all data is collecting before analysis begins, analysis 
begins immediately with grounded theory so that it can inform future interviews and 
allow for the testing of tentative theories as they develop.  
The researcher followed that approach here by reviewing transcripts and initially 
coding early in the process, as suggested by Charmaz (2014), to learn from the interviews 
and be advised of possible questions in future interviews. As suggested by Charmaz, 
gerunds were used for the initial codes because they give action and bring clarity to the 
concepts in the codes. The researcher also continually created memos and diagrammed 
connections between codes and concepts throughout the interviews and coding process. 
For example, the researcher generated as many as 18 memos and 36 networks in Atlas.ti 
to explore connections between and among codes and concepts. A reflexive journal was 
kept to record impressions during data collection and methodological challenges and 
successes, and a memo bank was also created to file and store all memoranda (Charmaz, 
2014; Creswell & Poth, 2018; Lopez & Emmer, 2000). A triangulation process was used 
throughout the process by comparing interview results to information contained in 
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documents such as state legislation, reports of reform efforts, and academic studies 
(Lopez & Emmer, 2000). This process ultimately yielded 50 initial codes, which can be 
seen along with a definition for each in a codebook at Appendix C. Ten focused codes 
were then identified through this same analytical process from the 50 initial codes. These 
ten focused codes are described in the section detailing results.  It was after focused codes 
were identified that the researcher went about formally constructing the theories 
described below, although these theories or portions of them were frequently tested on 
researchers throughout the interview process. An example of the coding process and how 
the researcher moved from quotations to initial code to focused code to theory can be 




CHAPTER IV – RESULTS 
The 18 interviews that occurred from October of 2020 to May of 2021 involved 
participants who were grouped into five categories: policymakers, judges and 
administrators, prosecutors, defenders, and inmates. Fifty initial codes were assigned to 
the testimony in the transcripts of these interviews, and through the iterative process of 
analysis used in grounded theory, 10 focused codes were eventually identified from these 
initial codes. These focused codes were clouding the data; creating requirements not in 
statutes; failing to buy-in; failing to reinvest savings; missing targets (people, programs, 
and places); missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform; non-cooperating defendants; 
pricing people out; resisting institutions; and suffocating and overwhelming population.   
Focused Codes Discussed 
Clouding the data 
Clouding the data refers to a lack of access to data at the state or local level. 
Sometimes this is because data does not exist, while other times it is because it is not 
shared. Five codes gave rise to this focused code: clouding the data, confusing 
inconsistency across jurisdictions, failing parts of drug courts, failing to reinvest savings, 
and needing oversight.  
Participants saw the lack of data to access as problematic in several ways. A 
primary one is the inability to adequately analyze policy without it. For example, one 
critique of reform shared by some participants is that it does not reduce the frequency of 
criminal activity. Rather, reform recharacterizes many offenses from felonies to 
misdemeanors and in so doing artificially decreases criminal counts that only record 
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felonies. So, for instance, it is not that people are not stealing with the same frequency, 
but that the amount they are stealing is no longer considered a felony. To the owner of a 
store, the theft is still a theft. It does not become less of a theft because the amount of 
money stolen was recharacterized from a felony to a misdemeanor. But, at present, 
participants claimed they did not have access to enough data to assess whether this 
concern is even a valid one. 
An additional problem is that the recharacterization not only has the potential to 
artificially decrease crime rates, but it also potentially pushes the administrative handling 
of these cases from the state to local governments. This potentially overburdens local 
governmental entities such as municipal courts, justice courts, and county courts and jails 
and results in the type of “system overload” theorized by Bernard, Paoline, and Pare 
(2005). When this occurs, more cases enter the system than can be processed through it in 
a timely manner, and this causes a backward pressure throughout the local criminal 
justice system that results in an inefficient handling of cases.  
Participants complained that a lack of access to data makes verifying the critique 
about overburdening local governments very difficult. One seasoned criminal defense 
lawyer who has been heavily involved in policymaking remarked: 
We just don’t have good data right now on who’s in our jail. But there 
was, there’s been no evidence, and PEER tried to, because they kept 
bringing this up year after year that 585 pushed all of this down to the 
local level. But PEER looked at it, there was a provision that if the, if the 
local law enforcement could show an added cost, because of 585, they 
could get state reimbursement. And no one ever made that claim, because 
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they just couldn’t show that they were seeing increased jail time for people 
because they get pushed down because of these cases, they get pushed 
down as misdemeanors.  
*** 
There’s no evidence that pushing them down to misdemeanors made them 
put a burden on the local governments. But we still hear that. When I’ve 
tried to bring up for discussion reclassification of simple possession and 
what they did in Oklahoma and make it a misdemeanor, we get the same 
thing that people there were saying: “Well, you know, that’s going to 
burden the city court system or the Justice Court system.” But I don’t, you 
know, I don’t know that that’s going to happen, you know. And then there 
were others who said, “you know, well, if they’re just misdemeanors, then 
they’re definitely not going to agree to go to drug court. That’s gonna 
really get fewer people in drug court, and that means we get less money 
for drug court.” 
Another veteran policymaker provided the following insight to this same theory: 
Remember a lot of things are now misdemeanors that used to be felonies. 
So once again, and I haven’t seen any numbers on the impact that’s having 
in local communities. But you remember there was some grumbling from 
law enforcement some time ago that all you’re doing is sending your 
problems to us that these are going to be and the problem with that is the 
databases out there for ascertaining what’s going on at the Justice Court 
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level and municipal court level and county court level are not that good. 
So it’s really kind of hard to come up with something. 
Another policymaker and defense lawyer responded as follows to a question of 
whether a lack of technology served as a barrier to data collection: 
But what we hear from [drug courts] is that some of it is technology. Some 
of it is, you know, the person, you’ve got to have somebody collecting the 
data, and reporting the data at the local level…we went to the legislature, 
NASS, the ASC, to collect data on indigency. How many lawyers, I mean, 
we literally, when we did a case study, we had to call every circuit clerk 
and then double check it with a court administrator to get a percentage of 
people who had public defenders, because there’s not, there’s no data 
collecting there. So there were some problems, I think, with the collecting 
and reporting from all of these various courts around, and then, you know, 
you do have to have the infrastructure there. 
There is also the problem of criminal justice agencies not wanting to share 
information even when they have it. A policymaker and defense lawyer offered: 
I’ve got some nonprofits that I asked for some data on a project we’re 
working on together, and you know, they’re like, we got to, you know, all 
very polite, but, you know, I’ve got to get approval for that. You know, 
because everybody wants the final data report that says they’re doing 
everything right. To go public, but they don’t want to share the data on the 
front end without knowing the answer. 
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The lack of access to data is incredibly problematic because it cripples the ability 
criminal justice professionals, policymakers, researchers, and the public to systematically 
analyze data and render scientifically reliable judgments about whether policies are 
working as intended. For example, it is entirely possible that reform measures have 
overburdened lower courts at the municipal, justice, and county court levels, but it is also 
unknown because the data is not there to analyze. If reform has overburdened lower 
courts, that would mean reform has achieved the opposite of one of its intentions, which 
was to provide for the speedier resolution of criminal cases in line with the constitutional 
right to a speedy trial. Transparency is needed.  
One final remark on transparency that came from a participant law enforcement 
officer who stated the following regarding body cameras: 
I’ll tell you, for a police reform, body camera has been huge. And you 
know, nationally, it’s been a great thing, you know, because not only are 
we capturing, you know, what exactly occurred, you know, whatever it is, 
a lot of times we’re getting evidence for the crash or investigation. And 
then when you talk about complaints, there’s been five more times than 
not, the person comes in and complains, watch the video, and it’s not what 
happened.   
Creating requirements not in statutes 
Creating requirements not in statutes refers to extra-statutory requirements 
imposed on persons as part of their participation in a reform measure or program. These 
extra-statutory requirements make the reform measure or program more stringent or 
“narrow” in scope than intended such that fewer people qualify for participation or 
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completion. For example, according to participants, some drug courts imposed extra-
statutory requirements on participants by adding unnecessary rules, and agencies 
promulgated regulations or adopted policies that constricted the reach of reform statutes 
such as those dealing with parole. This focused code was comprised of five codes: 
creating requirements not in statutes, failing parts of drug courts, missing the target 
audience, needing oversight, and pricing people out. 
With respect to the extra-statutory requirements imposed by some drug courts, 
one policymaker and defense lawyer stated the following (the name of the particular 
county is redacted in order to protect the identity of the participant): 
The other thing that really bothered me, when I looked into 
_______County, is I asked them for copies of their rules and regulations 
and the individual rules that they had for people, some of them are just 
silly, like, you can’t date without permission from the judge, can’t get 
married without permission. Some of these things are unconstitutional. 
You can’t wear jewelry. It was a bunch of just silly shit. The thing 
that really concerned me, and I think they’ve solved this problem now, but 
at the time, you couldn’t be on any prescription medication, which meant 
that if you had a mental health issue, and a lot of people who struggle with 
addiction do, you had to come off of your medication. It’s totally 
counterproductive.  
This ability of some drug courts to impose extra-statutory requirements and veer 




So, under statute, the Supreme Court is charged with certifying local drug 
courts and ensuring that they’re operating according to best practices. And 
there are a few people who are employed in the Supreme Court whose job 
it is to do that. They are governed by a drug court advisory board set up in 
statute, which is staffed by judges who obviously have an interest in 
whatever their interest is. And so they have not actually done what this 
actually has charged them with doing, which is visiting these local drug 
courts, ensuring that they’re operating the way they should be, and 
shutting down the ones that aren’t. And so you have, for instance, bad 
drug courts that aren’t really helping anybody. 
Earned discharge credits were an example of an agency adopting policies that 
constrict the reach of a reform statute to make it narrower than intended. Earned 
discharge credits enable those on supervision (probation or parole) to shorten their time 
through compliance with program requirements. According to a policymaker and defense 
lawyer, earned discharge credits arose in Mississippi because the federal government and 
many states, including Mississippi, took note that most problematic behavior by parolees 
and probationers occurred in first couple of years. Governments nationally reacted by 
reducing the maximum supervisory period that could be imposed on an offender to 
relieve the state of the burden of monitoring the person over a longer period than 
necessary and to relieve the person of the financial obligation. Mississippi already had a 
probation maximum of five years, which was not considered extraordinary. Therefore, 
the state took a slightly different approach, and a better one in the opinion of a policy 
maker and defender participant, by striking a balance with graduated sanctions for 
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supervision violations (the stick) and also earned discharge credits to reduce the 
supervision period with good behavior (the carrot). The participant reported that the state 
constricted the reach of this statute when it bent to pressures from prosecutors and local 
governments that needed the revenue stream from supervisees and discontinued earned 
discharge credits for some period of time after having adopted them. He qualified this 
observation, however, by stating he is not certain what the state is doing today. He 
described the situation as follows:  
But the first opposition we ran into, and I’m not sure what MDOC is doing 
today, but MDOC ultimately decided that they were going to not fight the 
prosecutors on this…Congressman Guest was the leader of this 
movement, when he was still a DA in Madison County…the problem that 
a lot of prosecutors saw and local governments…say, you know, when 
somebody gets sentenced, particularly to probation, they get loaded up 
with fines. And you can pay your fine over time…And the probation 
officer collects it. And so you’ve got this really good collection service, 
because the PO, they get the money, they turn it over to the 
county.…There was a lot of fear that, you know, if you let these people off 
probation earlier, then they’re not going to pay their fines…And so they 
were trying to get the legislature to not allow earned discharge credits if 
the person was in arrears, on their fines and fees, and ultimately MDOC 
adopted a policy that said that they were not going to give out discharge 
credits. So it’s sort of extended the amount of time people were on 
probation earned discharge credits.  
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A final example of creating requirements not in statutes involved judicial 
interpretation of the statute regarding technical violations of probation and parole. 
Criminal justice reform changed the law regarding revocation to apply graduated 
sanctions for supervision violations such that a first violation could result in 90 days in a 
Technical Violation Center (TVC), the second 120 days in a TVC, and the third the 
remainder of a sentence in prison. The intent was to prevent technical violations from 
quickly sending a person back to prison.  
According to one policymaker and defense lawyer, some judges were interpreting 
the statute to allow them to “stack” technical violations that were part of one revocation 
hearing in order to sentence the person to the remainder of their time. This struck the 
participant as not consistent with the intent of the statute: 
So the other thing that judges started doing is what we called stacking 
before. Because of the way the statute was written where it said for your 
first technical violation you can get 90 days, rather than saying, for your 
first revocation for technical violations, people would come in and the 
judge would say, “Well, you didn’t pay your supervision fee, you had a 
dirty test, and you failed to report for two weeks, that’s 1, 2, 3 technical 
violations.” And the way the law says is your first technical violation, it’s 
90 days, your second one 120. And your third, you can give the balance of 
the suspended sentence, the judges would just go 123, I’m sending you 
back to prison for the balance of your sentence. 
According to the participant, this practice was ultimately appealed to and upheld 
by the Mississippi “Supreme Court, with what I thought was a relatively disingenuous 
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opinion. But not a completely unreasonable one, given the language of the statute.” 
However, it was later remedied by the Mississippi Legislature with H.B. 387 where “they 
solved the problem. Now, the statute clearly says, you know, for your first revocation for 
one or more technical violations, maximum penalty is 90 days.” This obstacle is 
noteworthy both for the fact it was an obstacle and that obstacles can be remedied later 
through the representative democratic process. 
Failing to buy-in 
Failing to buy-in refers to persons who influence the implementation of criminal 
justice matters and oppose reform or parts of reform because they philosophically 
disagree with it or are skeptical of it. It is comprised of twelve codes, i.e., believing CJ 
reform should look different, believing in CJ goals that conflict with reform, creating 
requirements not in statutes, disagreeing with a reform measure, disagreeing with a 
program purpose, disagreeing with program substance, exercising racism, fearing crime, 
fearing people on drugs, ignoring reentry, misunderstanding reform, and viewing 
skeptically because of experience.  
One prosecutor succinctly captured two objections to reform by remarking that 
victims get lost in reform debates and reform often does not decrease the frequency of 
criminal incidents. It simply changes the way they are counted, a point discussed above.   
But right now, we’re on defense, because they’re trying to monkey with 
our habitual offender statutes, that’s really the only hammer we have left. 
Keep in mind, in this whole thing, you know, all prosecutors who have to 
do this for a substantial amount of time really start to understand the 




But, you know, if, if we want to change this, not just be talking, if 
we want to change, in my opinion, it doesn’t happen by decriminalizing 
criminal activity. That’s sort of like saying we’ve solved drunk driving by 
raising the blood alcohol limit to 2.3. You know, it’s like, hey, DUIs have 
fallen off 90%. But there’s still drugs out there on the road, you know 
what I mean?…So, you know, we don’t need to decriminalize acts to solve 
the crime problem. In fact, that only harms the innocent people, that harms 
the people out there who haven’t done anything to anyone. They become 
prey for these folks.  
This prosecutor also voiced frustration that reform was misdirected towards the 
wrong ends, and that more meaningful reform would be directed towards recidivism. 
From his vantage point: 
Your question was, what obstacles exist in the implementation of criminal 
justice reform? And, again, this is just my opinion, but you know, that 
presumes that it’s needed. And I’ll talk more about that in a second. You 
know, to me, what needs to happen is to keep recidivism down and to keep 
the percentage of our population from being locked up that’s currently 
locked up. That’s the big thing to me. And so it takes many, many forms, 
but our criminal justice reform happens every year in the legislature, every 
single year. Could you say that the key is to keep the people that need 
locked up, locked up? No, no, the key is to prevent recidivism. And to not 
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have the percentage of our population incarcerated that’s incarcerated 
now. 
*** 
So, you know, I think if people really, really want to make a 
difference, and really want to figure out what policies we can change, 
we’ve got to look at states that have implemented programs where 
recidivism is low. You talked about having some measurables. And I think 
you’re going to find that what they’re doing is they’re investing in those 
prisoners in those citizens to be productive citizens when they get out. 
Now, are they all going to do it? No, you know. Are most going to do it? 
Probably not. But if we reach the quarter to half, I think it’s worth the pain 
and suffering that we put our victims through, and the money we have to 
spend on housing when they offend again.  
He finished discussing this topic with this sobering observation, but also 
reiterating that recidivism should be a focus. The name of the county has been redacted to 
protect the participant’s identity:  
But the problem that I’ve seen in my 20 something years is almost a 
sociological one, which I don't think can be handled through legislation. 
You look at Mississippi and all the stats, and we’ve got one of the highest 
percentages of our population incarcerated. We’re probably one of the 
more poorly educated states, probably an extremely high percentage of our 
populations on some form of government assistance. We have a higher 
rate of poverty than most states. Higher percentage of single mothers, 
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fathers not in their children’s lives. Like I said, it’s almost a sociological 
problem when you have that gumbo, all those ingredients for that gumbo. 
You’re having folks that are going to commit crimes. And it’s not black, 
it's not white. I mean, I’m down here in ______ County. There’s not a 
black person down here. But it’s all the same problems. It's a lack of 
education. It’s meth everywhere. It’s not getting trained up properly. So 
what I think, and I think other prosecutors do, is the biggest reform we can 
do is to help the felons before they get out.  
To be clear, many actors within the criminal justice system do support reform 
efforts as a general matter, and this includes persons within the prosecutor group. One 
sheriff of a large county remarked: 
I think in a lot of cases, [criminal justice reform] is very, very helpful. 
Because here’s, here’s what I think that was changed that was not only 
helpful but needed, right. And it’s like I mentioned before, throw 
somebody away for 25 years on an auto felony, misdemeanor, marijuana, 
whatever, I think is a waste of time and space. A crack dealer, a crystal 
meth dealer, they really impact the community. I don’t think weed 
smokers impact the community…I think part of the reason why we’re in 
this particular shape with criminal justice reform is because back in the 
80s, prior to me, and when I don’t remember. If my recollection is correct, 
they did something called the 85% rule. Something like that. Right. So if 
you if you committed a crime and with a gun, you were required to do 
85% or your time. And also, if my recollection is correct, probably about 
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five, six years after that, it’s my recollection the population of Mississippi 
Department of Corrections went up, probably 50-60%. So now you’re 
stuck with all these folks doing sentences. And when you’re doing this 
legislation, I don’t think you’re thinking about where are you going with 
medical and all these other costs that occur when your incarceration rates 
goes up. So I think it was situation back then where I think the general 
consensus was, let’s just show everybody how hard we can be on 
criminals. But as a corporate cost, incarceration long term is a very 
complex issue that people really need to totally digest. So I am just saying 
this, I think that it turned into a monster. Now it costs a lot of money. 
The fact that there are actors within the criminal justice system who oppose and 
support reform simultaneously demonstrates the complex nature of the environment and 
difficulty of reducing everyone’s viewpoint to a single current of thought. The important 
point for purposes of identifying obstacles to implementation is that even if there are 
numerous actors within the system that support reform, the various components of the 
criminal justice system are disconnected enough that those who oppose reform are often 
able to hinder the implementation of different aspects of it. Additionally, even among 
those who generally support reform, the reasons for their support vary and this may result 
in varying degrees of support or opposition for specific components of reform.  
Failing to reinvest savings 
Failing to reinvest savings captures the idea that the legislature has failed to 
reinvest financial savings from reform and this has hindered full implementation of 
different reform programs and policies, such as drug courts and mental health measures. 
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This focused code was comprised of failing parts of drug courts, failing to reinvest 
savings, non-cooperating defendants, pricing people out, starving for dollars, and 
suffocating and overwhelming population.  
A recurring theme among participants about the varying wish-list programs that 
could be financed is that there is not enough money available: “The [] thing we run into is 
that there’s no, there’s no real funding out there in Mississippi for any of this,” according 
to a judge and former prosecutor, or “once again, money is always a constraint,” 
according to a policymaker. According to some participants, at least some of these 
programs could be financed if savings were redirected to them.  
A policymaker was succinct: 
One of the assumptions behind 585 was that any money we saved from 
corrections would be reinvested in the community and community-based 
programs. And one of the things that we’re concerned about on the 
taskforce is that we’re not seeing reinvestment. 
Another policymaker and judge was straight to the point: 
So the biggest complaint I’ve heard about 585, was that we, we realized 
the savings, um, because we had less people under the care of the state. 
But we’ve never reinvested the monies from 585 that we realized. And so 
we’ve continued to cut MDOC’s budget, but we haven’t increased their 
budget for programming, which we could have done because we realized 
the savings because of it. 
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He added that while reform legislation did not mandate savings be 
reinvested, it would be a prudent use of tax dollars and would also be exercising 
fidelity to how reform legislation was marketed, providing in part: 
I don’t think they were tied [to reinvesting] by law. I think it was more the 
way we sold those programs was saying we’re going to save money, and 
we ought to reinvest that in programming. The legislature increasingly 
does not like to do things to tie their own hands. They like to have every 
year freedom to make decisions about how they allocate money. And so I 
just I think that’s probably what happened. I’d be surprised if there was 
actually a legal requirement that they reinvest the money. 
Another policymaker and defense lawyer had thoughts on the particular uses of 
any reinvestment dollars: 
Justice reinvestment that was a big thing, you know, we’re going to save 
this money. But we don’t want to save it and put it in the general fund or 
do a tax rebate, we want to invest it. And so the thing is, is that some 
people thought reinvestment meant reinvesting in other aspects of the 
Department of Corrections. And there was some truth to that. There 
needed to be, there needed to be a shift from institution to community 
corrections. We needed to spend more money on community. I think the 
TVC is a justice reinvestment program. 
Most of that reentry work, and most of that justice reinvestment 
needs to go to our mental health system, the community mental health 
system, the unconstitutional system that we have, according to Carlton 
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Reeves. It’s, we knew, you know, we knew a lot of people coming into the 
criminal justice system, because they have mental health problems, a lot of 
people getting out of prison, who have mental health problems. So when 
we improve the community mental health centers, that’s justice 
reinvestment, that’s, that’s, you know, a recidivism reduction program. 
Yet another policymaker remarked on the difficult politics involved in redirecting 
savings and coupled the observation with a potential solution going forward: 
The state spends a lot of money from a percentage basis on corrections 
already. And it’s a tough sell to argue for reinvestment and any sort of 
reentry programming. Drug court, I think, has the money, that comes back 
to an administration problem. But yeah, it can be tough to get the funding 
you need for some of this stuff. But, you know, with, with the right 
mindset, the Department of Corrections, if we could actually implement 
some more sentencing reform to allow them to decrease their population, 
you could redirect a lot of the funding they have now to better uses than 
just hiring more guards. 
The idea at which he was driving is that so much money is already dedicated to 
corrections, even post-reform with savings, that it is difficult to convince lawmakers to 
take those savings and keep them in the corrections field for a treatment-preventative 
purpose. The idea he was pushing is that we need more sentencing reform, or full 
implementation of sentencing reforms that have already been enacted. Implicit in this 
idea is that further population reduction will take us below some yet-to-be-defined 
threshold of total spending that will then make it politically possible to make the case that 
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savings should be reinvested into criminal justice related programs. Until that happens, at 
least according to this participant’s perspective, it may be difficult to make the political 
case for reinvested spending even if that means it serves as an obstacle to full 
implementation of some programs and policies.   
Missing targets (people, programs, and places) 
Missing targets (people, programs, and places) has several dimensions and refers 
to the idea that policies are missing the population to which they are directed, are directed 
towards the wrong population, are using the wrong programs for the population, or are 
hosted at the wrong location. It is comprised of eight codes: delaying on TVCs, failing 
parts of drug courts, lacking programming substance, lacking systematic or scientific 
rigor, locating programs in the wrong environment, missing marks on revocation reform, 
missing the target audience, and needing oversight.  
TVCs were a primary example of missing a target by locating a program in the 
wrong location until the problem was eventually corrected. A policymaker and defender 
observed: 
The first setback for [TVCs] that we had was then under Commissioner 
Epps. He had a plan. The plan, for whatever reason, was he going to put 
the technical violation center over in Leake County on some land that the 
state had near the Walnut Grove facility. And when they, for whatever 
reason, they couldn’t get a state-local agreement going and they ended up 
not putting it there and they wanted to get it started so they just put it in at 
CMCF, and they just repurposed some of the area. And the first, the first 
task force, we went a year before the taskforce started meeting, one of the 
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first things we did was go visit the TVC. And it was just ridiculous. They 
had, they had one large room, which was the classroom, and they had it 
partitioned. And you had four classes going at the same time. And it just, 
it wasn’t, it was just a holding place for 90 days that they got some 
lectures and, and it took some time, but eventually, the department, and 
this is one of the things that I think Commissioner Hall did really well, 
was focused on getting the TVC up to what it was supposed to be where 
people would go for 90 days, get some intense job training, or maybe it’s 
drug and alcohol. But instead of sending them to Parchman for the AMD 
treatment, that’s really not any good, they had them going through this 
program. And you know, the one thing we haven’t seen, we haven’t 
looked at data on the outcomes of TVC, since it got set up in Delta 
correctional. But after a couple of visits there, especially for those of us 
who went on that first visit, you know, it was night and day. And there’s a 
lot, a lot of hope there that that program is working. 
Another policymaker commented on this issue of the wrong location for TVCs, as 
well as how TVCs continue to elude portions of the target population as a viable 
alternative to reincarceration:  
I think, initially, there were a lot of problems with the TVCs, and that they 
just looked more like jails than anything else. And, you know, the intent of 
those is to actually be more of a halfway house type situation. I think they 
do look more like that now. There’s a lot we could talk about what 
Commissioner Hall did wrong at the Department of Corrections. I think 
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that’s one of the things that they did right was improve the TVCs. And so I 
think that’s a little better. There’s a bigger issue, and that relates to how 
people end up there and why they end up there. MDOC still has a large 
amount of discretion about how they apply these, you know, technical 
violations for people who are on parole. Judges, and even the parole 
board, in some instances, end up revoking people and sending them back 
to prison for a lot of times what should be actually considered technical 
violations, or they do so without actually holding a hearing and given the 
due process that’s required when somebody is accused of committing a 
new crime while they’re on parole. That is a problem still. It was one of 
the things that was supposed to be addressed by 585. It is undoubtedly 
better today than it was pre-585. But there’s still a lot of people who are 
going straight back to prison on parole violations or probation violations, 
where, you know, there’s some subset, probably less than 50%, but around 
that number, who maybe shouldn’t be going back to prison and maybe 
should be going to a technical violation center, or maybe shouldn’t be 
violated at all. 
Yet another issue appears to be a delay in persons reaching a TVC. According to a 
policymaker and defender: 
Another big problem they had at the beginning is the person gets arrested, 
they sit in jail for weeks or sometimes months, then they go through 
classification. And several months later, they finally end up at the TVC. 
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And you really miss the opportunity to get this person turned around and 
ready to get back out on the street.  
Said another defender: 
I have very few clients that even make it up there. They spend 90 days in 
jail. Or 120 days in the county jail because there’s not enough, they’re not 
transporting enough people due to COVID concerns, which understand 
that the idea of a TVC is good, I guess…I don’t feel like people get there 
fast enough.  
One dimension of this focused code is using the wrong program for a population. 
Consistent with this dimension, and in-line with a prosecutor’s observations above in the 
focused code failing to buy-in about more focus needed on recidivism, the same 
prosecutor observed: 
If I could wave a magic wand, and it’s not going to happen because it 
costs too much money, is we have, like, in their last year of, you know, in 
prison needs to be in some sort of vo-tech halfway house, some sort of job 
skill program that really can help them get a job. 
TVCs were not the only program that received attention from participants. So too, 
for example, did drug courts, which some participants believed missed targets by 
admitting too many non-addicts as a get-out-of-jail free card or as a means to generate 
revenue. According to a policymaker, 
I will tell you what, I’ve seen more reformers who are no longer 
supportive of drug court because of the data that’s coming out a lot of 
these places. And so you see, and then this goes back to why drug courts 
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are supposed to operate and how they actually operate. The point is to 
address people with serious addiction issues that are leading them to 
crime. But because of the fee structure that we talked about, and just the 
discretion that comes to judges and prosecutors about who to get in there, 
um, so for instance, if you get caught breaking into somebody’s house to 
steal, to feed your drug habit, um, you’re probably less likely to get 
accepted into drug court than somebody who just gets caught with 
marijuana. So if you look at, and part of that is the incentive where judges 
and prosecutors say well, that’s more serious, you know, you need to go to 
prison for that, when in reality the point, the point of drug court is to 
address those very people whose addictions are so severe, they’re creating 
public safety problems. Um, but in reality, you know, a lot of people are 
just getting in there who don’t really have, don’t really have a drug 
problem. If you have a college kid that gets caught with marijuana, it’s 
unlikely they’re going to create problems for the state long term, like 
statistics. 
All of these dimensions to missing targets (people, programs, and places) 
serve as obstacles to implementation in different ways and for different lengths of 
time.  
Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform  
Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform refers to the idea that reform efforts to 
date have missed a major area of needed change, which is making changes necessary to 
reduce the amount of time a person spends in jail before trial. This focused code is less 
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about failing to implement a specific statute than it is reform legislation failing to address 
a problem that is routinely recognized by reform advocates. In this sense, part of the spirit 
of reform has not been implemented. It is significant because it raises constitutional 
concerns and therefore it is discussed here. Additionally, it was voiced strongly as an 
issue by a sheriff of a large county. It is comprised of the codes believing CJ reform 
should look differently and missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform.  
An interview with the previously mentioned sheriff crystalized this focused code, 
although other participants voiced opinions that supported it in varying ways and to 
varying degrees. The sheriff, grouped into the code group prosecutors, remarked:  
What I would like to see, though, is more attention paid to what happens 
pre-trial. Right. And I guess because it’s in our best interest as a 
department to look at that. And I would like to see more done. Like we got 
people down in the detention center now who have been down there more 
than 1000 days. Right. Which I think according to the Constitution, that’s 
a clear violation, you know, speedy trial, promise that you get as an 
American citizen. So that, that part there is problem, is lack of governance. 
The biggest problem that we face is just trying to get these people through 
to justice. And we don’t have control over that. So the criminal justice 
reform, most of the parts that I hear, it has to do with people that are 
already incarcerated…I’d like to see more with pre-trial detainees.  
These pre-trial delays were attributed to several factors. In some instances, it 
could simply be judges or prosecutors not moving cases along as speedily as they could. 
This might be due to a lack of diligence, while it might be due to case overload and the 
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need for more judges, prosecutors, and defenders. Some of the delay also might be out of 
the control of judges, prosecutors, and defenders. These factors out of their control 
include delays in mental health evaluations that are backlogged in the mental health 
system but necessary for trial, or delays in crime laboratory reports that are backlogged in 
the state crime laboratory and are necessary for some prosecutions, particularly 
homicides. While the diligence of public officials may be harder to address through 
legislation than at the ballot box, legislation and legislative funding can address staffing 
shortages and issues related to delays in mental health evaluations and crime laboratory 
reports. 
The sheriff continued, with the name of the county redacted in order to protect the 
identity of the participant: 
[I]n a lot of cases, there are certain individuals like right now, it’s about 
125 people that we got down in the [jail], that are that are waiting for 
mental evaluations…So how does that relate to your question about 
criminal justice reform? Most of the time, when I hear people talking 
about it, they’re talking about going back and looking at people who have 
been sentenced.  
*** 
And another thing on a state level that the legislature could do to 
help _______ County, in particular with their criminal justice system, is I 
mean, we need more judges…to handle this huge docket…they need to 
statutorily change their allotment of judges for _______ County…because 
I mean, if you think about it, we have people that are in our jail for three 
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years, before they even see a trial. Mississippi does not even care about 
speedy trial or nearly a speedy trial. So they’re in our system technically 
innocent. Which I mean, you know, the rate of recidivism, if, if you’re in a 
jail for one day to three days, I mean, it goes up exponentially as to 
whether or not you’re going to come back. So we’re basically 
manufacturing criminals. 
This focused code of missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform captures an 
important concept of needing to bring the accused to justice in a reasonably prompt 
fashion to guarantee speedy trial rights, and even beyond fulfilling constitutional 
guarantees, to provide for a more efficient and effective justice system. Allowing these 
problems to linger serves as an obstacle to the implementation of the spirit of reform, 
which widely embraces the view that pre-trial delays are too long and often extreme.   
Non-cooperating defendants 
Non-cooperating defendants refers to persons who choose not to participate in 
reform programs for one a reason or another, such as a personal calculation that serving 
time will be less onerous than compliance with a reform program’s requirements. The 
codes comprising this focused code were creating requirements not in statutes, failing to 
reinvest savings, non-cooperating defendants, and pricing people out. 
This focused code was most frequently described by participants when discussing 
drug courts. The idea articulated was that some defendants make personal decisions not 
to participate in drug courts because they believe the requirements are more onerous than 
other alternatives, even serving time. The point here is not to render a value judgement of 
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whether these conclusions reached by defendants are reasonable under the circumstances, 
but to note these conclusions are reached, reasonable or not.  
A prosecutor observed: 
They’re kind of smart, too. They know how much times over their head, 
and they can figure it out. If they got two years left on drug court, I mean, 
they don’t like it. You can’t have any fun. You can’t drink. You can’t do 
anything. You’ve got to work. You have to be in bed at a certain time. 
You have to wear ankle monitors and all that. No one wants it. Because if 
they got two years of drug court to finish and they’ve got three years over 
their head suspended, they’ll just go to the judge and tell them give me my 
time. They’d rather go to a year in prison or less than to do two years of 
having to live like drug court. 
This was put to a follow-up question: “There really are people who would rather 
do that?” Answer: “Yes, there’s a lot of people like that. And they know, they can 
calculate in their head.”  
An administrator and defender explained how this can work (with the county 
name redacted to protect the participant’s identity): 
This is another aspect of drug courts - why I don’t send my clients there. 
You know, ________ County is notorious for lenient sentences. I don’t 
know if that’s necessarily true. I think the volume – there’s no other 
option, there’s just no other option. But if I’m facing, say, an auto 
burglary. Okay. The maximum for auto burglary seven years. Well, if I’m 
in drug court, I can be in drug court for a five full years, right. Okay. Well, 
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if you want, I mean, this is an extreme, I’ve never heard someone say, 
“well, I want to do the seven years on auto burglary versus drug court.” 
But you would, logically, you would, because seven years, 25% of that 
seven years is what? A year and eight months, a year and seven months, 
and then you’re out. 
This participant, who was very familiar with drug court best practices, added: 
And that goes back to how long should a drug court be. The science is 
very clear. We should be sitting at 18 months to two years. Well, that’s not 
what the drug courts do in Mississippi [which is typically five years].  
Some participant defenders perceived a pronounced reticence to participate in 
drug courts from black defendants. They theorized there is a commonly shared belief 
among this demographic group that drug court is the quickest way to prison because it is 
too easy to run afoul of what are perceived as too many rules and regulations. This was 
articulated by a defender during his interview (with the county name redacted to protect 
the participant’s identity): 
I mean, and I’ll say that it is, to me, it’s still this way amongst the black 
community, probably in either jurisdiction [describing two neighboring 
counties], the quickest way to get to prison is to go to drug court… I’ve 
had a numerous clients, and you’ll hear it, it doesn’t matter black or white, 
but I know that I’ve, the times I would hear it are more from a black 
parent or our older sibling or uncle or you know, some kind of person 
going to a drug court. I mean, that’s quick, so I get stuck in prison. And 
it’s because you have all these hoops to jump through. And it’s hard. I 
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mean it is in _________ County. The reason I think that it was not 
recommended or that we did not encourage our clients to do it is because 
if they qualified for the public defender’s office, they were struggling 
financially and it required some financial means 
There is overlap between this focused code and another focused code, pricing 
people out. They are distinct enough that a decision was made that using different 
focused codes representing each was justified because participants discussed numerous 
situations where defendants did not cooperate for reasons unrelated to money. Sometimes 
the decision not to participate or comply with a reform measure is about outright defiance 
rather than a calculation of how onerous a reform measure may be. As told by a judge 
and former prosecutor: 
The one that stands out, in my mind the most. I had a young guy, tracking 
firearms, which is a minimum of 15 years. He got a non-adjudication. And 
I’ll never forget the probation officer standing up there saying, “I told him 
come, you know, when can you come see? You name the day. You name 
the time and I’ll be here.” Guy just wouldn’t come. And then the guy pops 
off and he says, “Well, I’m clean, I haven’t been smoking weed.” And I 
told him “I don’t care. I don’t care about your smoking marijuana. But 
what I care about is you’re able to get to your dealer to buy weed, but you 
can’t get up here to probation.” You know, I mean, that’s a problem. And 
he didn’t show up for nine months. 
That person went from a non-adjudicated sentence to serving 15 years in prison. 
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This focused code may not seem intuitive or be the first obstacle that comes to 
mind, but data from participant-interviewees indicates that reticence from potential 
reform program participants can itself serve as an obstacle to implementation. This 
speaks to a need to either adjust some program requirements or convince more people to 
take advantage of reform programs, or both.  
Pricing people out 
Pricing people out refers to when some persons are priced-out of participating in 
reform programs because they cannot afford the fees. It is comprised of the codes 
exercising racism, failing parts of drug courts, needing oversight, and pricing people out. 
There is overlap between this focused code and the focused codes failing to invest 
savings and non-cooperating defendants, discussed above. 
Drug courts were a primary example of a reform program that not all potential 
participants can afford. Drug courts vary considerably from county to county because 
individual drug courts have significant discretion in precisely how they are run and 
financed. Some drug courts offer very affordable or largely free participation while others 
do not. There were two main observations from participants about the effect of those drug 
courts where participation is relatively costly: (1) not all who need it can afford it, and 
therefore potential participants pursue other avenues when otherwise they would be an 
ideal drug court candidate, and (2) this financial barrier falls more heavily on the black 
population than others. Participants pointed to the demographics of drug court 




For example, a policymaker stated the following: 
There are huge racial disparities. You are much more likely to get into 
drug court if you are white. If you look at counties that have a pretty equal 
balance racially, you’ll see most people who get charged with drug 
offenses are African American. There’s a huge disparity there. You see 
more people charged with drug offenses from the African American 
community. That’s not new. But when you look at the people who make it 
to drug court, it’s completely flipped. I mean, it’s like 60% white people 
who get into drug court, and a lot of that is just a reflection of poverty. 
You have to pay to get into drug court. In Mississippi, you have monthly 
fees. You have to pay for all your testing that you have to do. If you can’t 
afford it, then you’re not in. Some drug courts managed to make that more 
equitable by, you know, the judges get to operate this fund however they 
choose. And so a lot of them use it to cover their expenses, and create 
scholarships with what’s left to allow folks who can’t afford it to get in. 
Some don’t do that and sit on the money or spend it for other reasons. In 
my mind, this is a prime example of what the Supreme Court should be 
doing and going in and saying, hey, look, if your numbers don’t reflect the 
people who are actually charged with these offenses, then you’re opening 
yourself up to a federal lawsuit for you know, an equal protection 
violation which has been threatened over this. But the Supreme Court is 
not doing that. They’re shackled by the advisory board that’s run by 
judges. And I think the only reason there hasn’t been a lawsuit about this, 
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because it’s a pretty clear problem. And you’re, you’re precluding 
someone from getting a benefit solely based on their economic situation. 
And so the only reason that hasn’t been filed, I believe, is because they 
don’t want to shut down drug courts completely, because we recognize 
that it does help some people. 
Another policymaker and defender had similar remarks: 
585 gave [drug courts] a bunch more money because they weren’t giving 
them enough money to begin with. So again, the state money and started 
with some requirements of them using best practices and implementing 
some standards. And then as we looked at it over the next couple of yours, 
the eye opener for me was when we got them to report to us the data that 
they’re supposed to report every year. There was, I think it was 63% of the 
people in drug court were white. And, you know, people who’ve studied 
drug abuse know, you’re as likely to use drugs, maybe slightly more 
likely, but about the same white or black. We’re all doing drugs. And, and, 
you know, we know, there’s, maybe because of policing practices, and it’s 
just, you know, if you’re doing them hanging out on the street corner, as 
opposed to doing them in your living room, you’re more likely to get 
arrested. So, so there’s some statistical changes, things that come into play 
that explain why in Mississippi we’ve got slightly more black people than 
white people getting arrested for drugs. But then you turn around and look 
at 63% of people in drug court. And nobody could explain that. And I 
think that when you when you start looking at drug court and finding out 
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all the fees, some of them were mandatory. They’ve made a way put a 
waiver in giving the judge authority to waive fees. There were people that 
if you had the money to pay for your assessment, you pay to get in. If you 
need to and can pay for treatment, and then you could get in drug court. 
And if you couldn’t do that, then you couldn’t get in drug court. So it 
wasn’t a thing that drug court administrators were saying, you know, we 
don’t like black people. We’re not going to let you in. It was all the system 
was built up in a way that it was just going to be impossible for most of 
the black defendants to get in.  
These observations crystalized how fees can serve as an obstacle to persons 
participating in reform programs when otherwise they might be ideal candidates. As 
noted above, there is considerable thematic overlap between this focused code and failing 
to reinvest savings and non-cooperating defendants. The overlap with failing to reinvest 
savings is that savings could be redirected into programs such as drug courts so that 
persons who are otherwise unable to pay fees could participate. Similarly, the overlap 
with non-cooperating defendants is that many of these defendants do not cooperate and 
participate for the very reason that they cannot afford to, and if the savings were 
reinvested and therefore these persons were made able to afford to participate, then some 
percentage of these non-cooperative defendants would presumably become cooperating 
ones.  
Resisting institutions 
Resisting institutions refers to sectors or institutions within the criminal justice 
apparatus opposing a reform. It was comprised of the fourteen codes believing in CJ 
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goals that conflict with reform, believing CJ reform should look differently, creating 
requirements not in statutes, curtailing judicial discretion, curtailing prosecutorial 
discretion, misunderstanding reform, disagreeing with a reform measure, disagreeing 
with program purpose, disagreeing with program substance, misunderstanding reform, 
politicking and perceptions of political power, protecting their financial interests, 
protecting turf, resisting institutions, and viewing skeptically because of experience. 
Participants most commonly mentioned opposition to reform from prosecutors 
and law enforcement, with judges also being mentioned frequently. According to one 
policymaker: 
I would say the biggest constituency that’s opposed to almost all this stuff, 
all this stuff is the prosecutors and district attorneys. You know, they 
generally are reflexively against any sort of criminal justice reform that 
comes out of the legislature or is considered by the legislature. They’re 
very active in lobbying. They’re at the Capitol every day during the 
session. And they’re the ones who are really the leading constituency 
against this. 
This viewpoint was reiterated by two other policymakers. Said one in 
response to a question about obstacles to implementation he had seen: 
The prosecutors. So the law enforcement community has this paradigm 
where, you know, initially, they say, look, we don’t make the laws, we 
enforce the laws. But that’s totally not true. They are, law enforcement, 
especially the lobbyist for the prosecutors and the Sheriffs Association. 
The Chiefs of Police don’t seem to matter as much because they’re not an 
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elected position. Like the chiefs of places, you know, anyway, they just 
don’t have, the Chiefs of Police don’t have the same sort of political stroke 
that the prosecutors and the sheriffs do. The sheriff is obviously a very 
politically powerful position because it’s an elected official in a county 
and the prosecutor because the prosecutors are elected as well. 
Said another policymaker: 
I generally think it is so ingrained in law enforcement and prosecutors, the 
way they’ve been doing it. I don’t really think they see that there’s a 
problem. Um, I, the way they resist change every single year to every 
single reform with very few exceptions. 
According to this same policymaker, much of this opposition is based on 
reform making prosecution more difficult: 
I mean, there’s just a practical reason that I’d also argue that they have 
more of an incentive for, not for nothing to change in the criminal justice 
system, but they stand to lose the most by any sort of sentencing reforms, 
because it just, frankly, makes their jobs harder. If you have, if you have a 
huge mandatory sentence to hold over someone’s head, it makes it much 
easier to get a guilty plea right then than if they have parole eligibility, 
and, you know, maybe they’re willing to roll the dice and actually go to 
trial, if the sentence is not that tough. And so you have, I’m sure you’re 
familiar with the trial penalty, where, you know, outcomes are worse for 
folks who choose to exercise their right to a trial. And so I think that’s at 
the heart of it. That’s, that’s where a lot of this opposition comes from. 
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And so you see, prosecutors being the leading voice against a lot of 
reform, because they just, from an incentive perspective, you know, just 
makes their jobs harder. 
According to another policymaker, the political power of the prosecutor and law 
enforcement community is leveraged by law-and-order constituencies: 
That’s what, that’s what a lot of this comes down to is that, you know, 
there’s a, there’s a constituency of people who are just reflexively against 
any sort of criminal justice reform. Within the legislature, I think those are 
pretty small, outside, but they’re able to leverage, they’re able to leverage 
some powerful interest groups, like law enforcement and sheriffs onto 
their side. And, and that’s kind of, that’s the tension that exists. 
A prosecutor participant shared the following regarding opposition to reform, but 
he characterized the opposition as defense and noted prosecutors and sheriffs are the ones 
who see criminals the most: 
Every year we have to fight. We have an agenda, the prosecutors’ 
association, that we push that we want to see happen. And we’re usually 
lockstep with the Sheriffs’ Association. You know, the two groups that 
really see the criminals the most. And so, like right now, the last few 
years, we’ve been on defense. That’s what we’re having to do. It’s all 
money driven. And the 585 changes that happened, it did affect MDOC, 
but not to the extent they wanted it to. They’re still, you know, packed in 
there. And it just didn’t save the money they were hoping so they keeping 
pushing for more and more things. 
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But prosecutors are not always against reform measures. According to the same 
prosecutor quoted above: 
And what it, what [585] did, the whole goal was, as you know, was to get 
people out of MDOC, or at least get them out of prison. They can still be 
supervised and things like that. But it was cost driven. And we in the 
Prosecutors’ Association fought this, law enforcement, sheriff’s 
departments, they all fought it. We were able to get rid of some things. But 
this was kind of shoved down our throats. And I have to admit, you know, 
now after six, seven years of this, I like it, I like it a lot. It’s much more 
fair [continuing on to discuss that sentencing reductions and parole 
eligibility at 25% for nonviolent offenses and 50% for violent offenses 
were more fair]. 
The code misunderstanding reform was relevant to this focused code as 
demonstrated by a policymaker when stating: 
I think a lot of these sheriffs and police chiefs, when you sit down and 
actually go through, you know, the actual content of these policies and 
what they’re intended to do and how they’re implemented, you don’t meet 
a lot of objection. I think that they are leveraged by a lot of people who are 
just opposed to it in any form. And so that’s, that’s a lot of the tension at 
play for sure. 
Judges were also noted as hindering aspects of reform. For example, one 
policymaker and defender discussed opposition from judges to reform regarding parole, 
revocation, and the new use of graduated sanctions and TVCs: 
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The thing that I want to emphasize is that judges are continuing to find 
ways to get around these graduated penalties of 90 days, 120 days, and 
then the balance of this suspended sentence. 
Prosecutorial and judicial resistance was most frequently associated with limits on 
discretion, and interviews revealed that opposition to the actual implementation of 
specific reform measures was often associated with some type of financial interest. 
Interviews also revealed that many prosecutors were not opposed to some aspects of 
reform once it was more fully understood, but there also appear to be philosophical 
divides on some points for which it will be difficult to bridge the divide between a more 
law and order-oriented constituency and a reform one. Where the groups prosecutors and 
judges and administrators can and do serve as obstacles to implementation is through 
exercising power to constrict the reach of reform statutes within their sphere of influence.  
Suffocating and overwhelming population 
Suffocating and overwhelming population refers to a population too large for a 
policy or program to be implemented successfully. It is composed of codes overloading 
probation and parole officers, suffocating and overwhelming population size, and failure 
to reinvest savings.  
Probation and parole was the primary example. A participant from the judges and 
administrators group identified the probation and parole population as entirely too large 
for any probation or parole officer to have any realistic chance of providing adequate 
services: 
I’ll be frank, you want to talk about something doesn’t work: probation. 
Probation and parole don’t work. It does not work. It’s a mathematical 
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impossibility. I mean, I don’t pick on my probation and parole agents, but 
if you run the math, I would be curious how many people each agent is 
assigned to supervise. It has to be hundreds. It has to be in the hundreds if 
you just look at the population that is technically on parole or 
probation…But I mean, if you just look, if you say you have 300, 400 
people on your docket as an agent, that you have to get reports for them 
every month, and there’s only 20 working days in a month, you’re talking 
20 people per day. On average. Probation really is you just show up, you 
sign a piece of paper. That’s probation. Is that a deterrent? I mean, I end 
up revoking a lot of people, though, because they don’t show up to sign a 
piece of paper. And I mean, you know, I tell them on the front end, I’m 
like, this is the easiest thing ever. You literally show up. I can’t revoke 
you because you can’t pay. I mean, that’s against the law. You got to show 
up and say “present.” 
He later added about probation and parole officers: 
I wouldn’t do it. I wouldn’t do it. I mean, I’m just gonna be frank, it’s, it’s 
the worst job in law enforcement, other than being a prison guard. Other 
than being a prison guard, it’s the worst job in law enforcement in my 
opinion.  
When suffocating and overwhelming populations are present, it serves as an 
obstacle to implementation. There is overlap between this focused code and failure to 
reinvest savings because arguably some savings could be redirected towards programs 
such as probation and parole. This money could be used to increase the pay and number 
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of officers, which in turn could increase the amount of time each officer dedicates to each 
person and the quality of service provided to those serving supervisory sentences.   
Between Group Comparison of Participant Groups 
The five groups into which participants were categorized were policymakers, 
judges and administrators, prosecutors, defenders, and inmates. After identifying focused 
codes from all of the testimony of all of the participants, the frequency with which these 
focused codes could be identified in the testimony of specific participant groups was also 
determined. These were then rank ordered for each participant group by frequency. 
Although constructivist grounded theory holds the frequency with which a code is 
identified is not determinative of its ultimate significance in the larger picture, an 
inference can be made that a topic is likely important if it is discussed repeatedly by 
various participants. Below is a discussion of top three focused codes identified by each 
group, and then a comparison of each group by these top three.  
Top Three Focused Codes by Group 
Policymakers. The top three focused codes discussed by policymakers were 
failing to buy-in, resisting institutions, and missing targets (people, programs, and 
places), as shown in Table 2. Failing to buy-in was discussed 81 times, resisting 
institutions 66 times, and missing targets (people, programs, and places) 53 times. Other 
top focused codes discussed by policymakers included missing the mark, needing pre-
trial reform (30 times), failing to reinvest savings (29 times), creating requirements not 
in statutes (27 times), pricing people out (27 times), non-cooperating defendants (20 




Table 2  Focused codes by policymakers  
  Policymakers 
Failing to buy-in 81 
Resisting institutions 66 
Missing targets (people, programs, and 
places) 
53 
Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform 30 
Failing to reinvest savings 29 
Creating requirements not in statutes 27 
Pricing people out 27 
Non-cooperating defendants 20 
Clouding the data 13 
Suffocating and overwhelming population 12 
Totals 358 
 
Prosecutors. The top three focused codes discussed by prosecutors were resisting 
institutions, failing to buy-in, and missing targets (people, programs, and places), as 
shown in Table 3. Resisting institutions was discussed 31 times, failing to buy-in 19 
times, and missing targets (people, programs, and places) 17 times. Other top focused 
codes discussed by policymakers included suffocating and overwhelming population (14 
times), pricing people out (11 times), creating requirements not in statutes (11 times), 
failing to reinvest savings (8 times), missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform (8 times), 




Table 3  Focused codes by prosecutors  
  Prosecutors 
Resisting institutions 31 
Failing to buy-in 19 
Missing targets (people, programs, and 
places) 
17 
Suffocating and overwhelming population 14 
Pricing people out 11 
Creating requirements not in statutes 11 
Failing to reinvest savings 8 
Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform 8 
Non-cooperating defendants 5 
Clouding the data 4 
Totals 128 
 
Defenders. The top three focused codes discussed by defendants were missing 
targets (people, programs, and places), resisting institutions, and failing to buy-in, as 
shown in Table 4.  Missing targets (people, programs, and places) and resisting 
institutions were both discussed 57 times, and failing to buy-in was discussed 47 times. 
Other top focused codes discussed by policymakers included failing to reinvest savings 
(31 times), pricing people out (31 times), creating requirements not in statutes (29 
times), non-cooperating defendants (29 times), clouding the data (15 times), missing the 
mark, needing pre-trial reform (11 times), and suffocating and overwhelming population 




Table 4  Focused codes by defenders  
  Defenders 
Missing targets (people, programs, and 
places) 
57 
Resisting institutions 57 
Failing to buy-in 47 
Failing to reinvest savings 31 
Pricing people out 31 
Creating requirements not in statutes 29 
Non-cooperating defendants 29 
Clouding the data 15 
Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform 11 
Suffocating and overwhelming population 7 
Totals 314 
 
Judges & Administrators. The top three focused codes discussed by judges and 
administrators were resisting institutions, failing to reinvest savings, and missing targets 
(people, programs, and places), as shown in Table 5. Resisting institutions was discussed 
27 times, failing to reinvest savings 21 times, and missing targets (people, programs, and 
places) 19 times. Other top focused codes discussed by policymakers included clouding 
the data (18 times), failing to buy-in (18 times), pricing people out (18 times), creating 
requirements not in statutes (16 times), non-cooperating defendants (14 times), missing 
the mark, needing pre-trial reform (12 times), and suffocating and overwhelming 




Table 5  Focused codes by judges and administrators  
  Judges & 
Administrators 
Resisting institutions 28 
Failing to reinvest savings 21 
Missing targets (people, programs, and 
places) 
19 
Clouding the data 18 
Failing to buy-in 18 
Pricing people out 18 
Creating requirements not in statutes 16 
Non-cooperating defendants 14 
Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform 12 
Suffocating and overwhelming population 12 
Totals 176 
 
Inmates. The top three focused codes discussed by the participant-inmate were 
failing to buy-in, missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform, and missing targets (people, 
programs, and places), as shown in Table 6. Failing to buy-in was discussed four times, 
missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform three times, and missing targets (people, 
programs, and places) and suffocating and overwhelming population were both 




Table 6 Focused codes by inmate  
  Inmates 
Failing to buy-in 4 
Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform 3 
Missing targets (people, programs, and 
places) 
2 
Suffocating and overwhelming population 2 
Clouding the data 0 
Creating requirements not in statutes 0 
Failing to reinvest savings 0 
Non-cooperating defendants 0 
Pricing people out 0 
Resisting institutions 0 
Totals 11 
 
Comparison of the Top Focused Codes Identified by Group 
Having identified the top three focused codes identified by each group, it is 
possible to compare the groups to one another. This is shown in Table 7. Five of the 
focused codes, i.e., clouding the data, creating requirements not in statutes, non-
cooperating defendants, pricing people out, and suffocating and overwhelming 
populations were not discussed with enough frequency by of the participants groups to 
make a top three, although according to Charmaz (2014) this should not be dispositive of 




Table 7  Comparison of groups by top three focused codes  
Focused Code Code Group 
Clouding the data 
 
 
Creating requirements not in statutes  
 







Failing to reinvest savings Judges and Administrators 
 


























Suffocating and overwhelming population 
 
 
Policymakers, prosecutors, and defenders share the same top three, i.e., failing to 
buy-in, resisting institutions, and missing targets (people, programs, and places), but the 
frequency with which each group discussed these three differed. For example, 
policymakers discussed failing to buy-in the most, prosecutors resisting institutions, and 
defenders missing targets (people, programs, and places). Based on characterizations of 
each professional group, it is not difficult to theorize why these would be the top focused 
code for each group. Policymakers would be likely take a global view and ascribe reform 
resistance to those who “don’t understand” or simply do not believe in it. Prosecutors 
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would be likely to resist as an institution because they have the most to lose through the 
implementation of reforms that diminish their negotiating power with criminal 
defendants. Defenders would be likely to believe in reform generally but also believe 
reforms are missing the mark in some way based upon what they are seeing at the ground 
level.    
Like policymakers, prosecutors, and defenders, the testimony of judges and 
administrators contained resisting institutions and missing targets (people, programs, and 
places) with enough frequency to be two of the top three focused codes for the group. 
However, judges and administrators differed from the other three groups by discussing 
failing to reinvest savings with enough frequency to have it as the other top focused code 
instead of failing to buy-in. Notably, failing to reinvest savings was identified by all 
participant groups with the exception of the one inmate interviewed. It ranked fifth 
among policymakers, seventh among prosecutors, and fourth among defenders (see 
Tables 2-6). The inmate participant differed from all of the groups by discussing missing 
the mark, needing pre-trial reform with enough frequency to place it among his top three. 
Again, with constructivist grounded theory the frequency with which a focused 
code is discussed is not determinative of whether it is the most important. However, 
frequency can supply at least an inference that something important is occurring, and 
frequencies are identified above for the purpose of highlighting topics which appear to be 




Articulation of Theories 
The purpose of this study was to build a grounded theory or theories that identify 
and explain obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform. Consistent with 
this purpose, seven theories have been developed by identifying themes underlying and 
linking the focused codes discussed above. These seven are (1) failure to convince, (2) 
failure to hit targets, (3) failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language, (4) failure to 
make data accessible, (5) failure to reinvest, (6) failure to make programs affordable, and 
(7) failure to address pre-trial problems. These theories are not listed in order of 
importance. Additionally, one theory was identified that potentially had the most 
explanatory power for capturing implementation obstacles in Mississippi. That theory is 
failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language. 
Theory 1: Failure to convince 
Failing to convince persons with power of the necessity or benefit of reform will 
result in persons and potentially institutions hindering implementation. This may seem 
obvious, but it is worth articulating and amplifying because resistant individuals can and 
do impede implementation. It is one thing for a reform measure to pass the legislature 
with the majority required for passage. It is quite another for that measure to be 
implemented by someone far removed from the legislature who may not agree with 
reform and would have voted against it.  
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 3. For figure and the other 
figures used below that were created using Atlas.ti (Figure 3 – 9), a box with two 
diamonds represents a focused code, while a box with one diamond represents an initial 
code. The two primary focused codes from which the theory is formed are failing to buy-
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in and resisting institutions. Both contribute to a failure to convince some persons of the 
benefit of reform and thereby contribute to their hindering its implementation in some 
way. The initial codes falling underneath those two focused codes that are pertinent to the 
theory can also be in Figure 3. As can be seen, some of the initial codes are tied directly 
to both focused codes, while other initial codes are tied directly to one focused code only. 
Failing to buy-in and resisting institutions shared the initial codes believing in CJ goals 
that conflict with reform, believing CJ reform should look differently, creating 
requirements not in statutes, disagreeing with program purpose, disagreeing with 
program substance, disagreeing with a reform measure, misunderstanding reform, and 
viewing skeptically because of experience. The initial codes that were tied directly to 
failing to buy-in only were fearing crime, ignoring reentry, and fearing people on drugs. 
The initial codes that were tied directly to resisting institutions only were protecting their 
financial interests, curtailing prosecutorial discretion, resisting institutions, protecting 
turf, and curtailing judicial discretion. All of them relate in some way and degree to the 




Figure 3. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Convince.  
 
In a sense this theory may serve to ratify that which people intuitively know to be 
true, i.e., a failure to convince people of the benefit of reform will result in them serving 
as an obstacle to it. However, it deserves mention and amplification because it is 
ubiquitous.  
Theory 2: Failure to hit targets 
Sometimes reform policies and programs are directed towards the wrong people, 
use the wrong programs, or are enacted at the wrong location. Whichever circumstance 
applies, targets are missed and it will serve as an obstacle to implementation. Specific 
examples illustrate how this theory works in practice. Housing TVCs in prisons, as 
discussed above, is a perfect example of enacting a reform program at the wrong location 
and thereby hindering full implementation. Sending non-addicts or persons without 
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substance use disorders to drug courts is an example of applying a reform program to the 
wrong people. This has the potential effect of not only taking spaces from those for 
whom the program is intended, but also shifting the very focus of the program from a 
serious rehabilitation program to a way station of sorts for those solely looking for an 
expungement and clearing a record. Use of the wrong programs was less discussed by 
participants, but one example that did arise was the inmate participant’s discussion of 
alcohol and dependency treatment in prison, which he believed to be inadequate. These 
examples illustrate how missing targets is an obstacle.  
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 4. This theory is based 
primarily on the focused codes creating requirements not in statutes and missing targets 
(people, programs, and places). The initial codes associated with the focused codes and 
relevant to the theory are also shown. The two focused codes share the initial codes 
needing oversight, meeting the target audience, and failing parts of drug courts. The 
initial codes creating requirements not in statutes and pricing people out were associated 
directly with the focused code creating requirements not in statutes only, while the initial 
codes delaying on TVCs, missing marks on revocation reform, lacking programming 
substance, locating programs in the wrong environment, and lacking systematic or 




Figure 4. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Hit Targets. 
 
Theory 3: Failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language  
Requirements are sometimes imposed on persons during their participation in a 
reform measure or program when the requirements are not found in the statute. When a 
person with authority exercises his or her power to constrict the reach of a reform statute 
so that it is narrower than intended by the Legislature, this is a failure to exercise fidelity 
to statutory language. Examples of this included judges who “stacked” violations in 
creative ways in order to trigger revocations to prison, drug court judges who imposed 
requirements on participants regarding personal medication, and earned discharge credits 
that at least for a time were reportedly not made available to those serving supervisory 
sentences. 
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 5. This theory finds its 
foundation first and foremost in the focused code creating requirements not in statutes, 
but it also received strong support from the focused codes clouding the data, failing to 
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buy-in, failing to reinvest savings, missing targets (people, places, and programs), and 
resisting institutions.  
Figure 5. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Exercise Fidelity to Statutory 
Language. 
 
There can be overlap between the different theories set forth in this dissertation, 
and that is certainly the case between this theory and others such as the failure to 
convince, failure to hit targets, and failure to make data available. It is likely the case 
that many of the very persons who impose extra-statutory requirements are also persons 
who have not been entirely convinced of the merits of reform, that a failure to exercise 
fidelity to statutory language can result in targeting programs to the wrong populations or 
housing programs in the wrong locations, and that the inability of the public to access 




Theory 4: Failure to make data accessible 
You cannot improve what you cannot measure. Consistent with that oft-repeated 
phrase, it is difficult to implement policy well or improve upon it when implementation 
cannot be measured, and implementation cannot be measured without data. As stated and 
repeated by participants in this research, much data that would be useful is in fact not 
accessible, either by design or because recordkeeping practices or technology do not 
make it possible. Such was the case with claims that reform drove the administrative 
handling of criminal activity from the state to local governments and in the process 
overloaded local systems. It was difficult to impossible for participants to ever assess the 
validity of those claims because they lacked the data to do so. Regardless of why data is 
not accessible, the lack of it serves as an obstacle to implementation. To more fully 
implement reform, any jurisdiction overseeing it should look for ways to record data and 
make it available.  
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 6. The theory arises directly 
from the focused code clouding the data. The initial codes underlying the focused code 
are clouding the data, confusing inconsistency across jurisdictions, failing parts of drug 




Figure 6. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Make Data Accessible. 
 
Theory 5: Failure to reinvest   
This theory is built directly from the focused code failing to reinvest savings. The 
focused code is based on the idea the state should be taking savings realized as a result of 
reforms and reinvesting them into criminal justice related programs. The theory is that the 
failure to do so has prevented full implementation of reform measures, and examples 
abound of where savings realized from reform could be reinvested into the system. For 
example, some persons cannot participate in drug court programs because of fees. 
Savings realized from reform could be redirected to reform efforts such as drug courts so 
that all or at least more can participate. Other examples of where funds could be 
reinvested include reentry and inmate training, the number and pay of probation and 
parole officers, and addressing mental health care needs that often overlap with criminal 
justice matters.  
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 7. While this theory arises 
directly from the focused code failing to reinvest savings, it is also finds strong support 
from clouding the data, non-cooperating defendants, and suffocating and overwhelming 
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population. Inability to access and review data may be preventing reinvestment that 
might occur if it were accessible to be used to make a case for the prudential use of 
taxpayer dollars through reinvestment, such as reinvestment to address unaffordable fees 
that sometimes result in non-cooperating defendants and issues associated with 
supervising large parole and probation populations.  
Figure 7. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Reinvest. 
 
The initial codes that are associated with these focused codes and relevant to this 
theory are also included in Figure 7. There is considerable overlap between the initial 
codes assigned to each focused code. A straightforward listing is that the focused code 
failing to reinvest savings is associated with the initial codes failing to reinvest savings, 
failing parts of drug courts, non-cooperating defendants, starving for dollars, and 
suffocating and overwhelming population. The focused code non-cooperating defendants 
is associated with clouding the data, failing parts of drug courts, and non-cooperating 
defendants. The focused code clouding the data is associated with clouding the data, 
confusing inconsistency across jurisdictions, failing parts of drug courts, failing to 
reinvest savings, and needing oversight. Finally, the focused code suffocating and 
overwhelming population is associated with the initial codes clouding the data, 
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overloading probation and parole officers, and suffocating and overwhelming 
population.  
Note that one policymaker opined that politically it will be very difficult to 
successfully argue that money should be reinvested in treatment-preventative programs. 
This is because even after savings realized from reform and decreased allocations to 
MDOC over the past several years, it is still the case that MDOC receives a substantial 
amount of money each year as a share of the state budget. This was one reason why he 
advocated for more sentencing reform as a means to further reduce the size of the 
incarcerated population and perhaps then save enough that a better case can be made for 
reinvestment.  
Theory 6: Failure to make programs affordable   
Reform will not be fully implemented if potential participants cannot enroll in 
programs because of cost-prohibitive fees. According to participants, such has been the 
case in Mississippi with reform programs such as some drug courts. One intent of 
criminal justice reform is to decrease the likelihood a person will reoffend through 
participation in applicable programs. This intent is not dependent upon economic class 
such that only the more well-to-do are intended to benefit from reform. In reality, 
however, reform participation becomes dependent upon economic class when fees are 
unaffordable to significant segments of the population. Programs of course have costs, 
and these costs have to be recouped from somewhere. This is where this theory overlaps 
with the Theory of a Failure to Reinvest. Reinvesting could be addressed to programs that 
are currently unaffordable to some by subsidizing their participation with savings realized 
from reform.   
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The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 8. The theory is grounded in 
the focused codes creating requirements not in statutes, failing to reinvest savings, non-
cooperating defendants, and pricing people out. The focused code creating requirements 
not in statute is associated with initial codes failing parts of drug courts, needing 
oversight, and pricing people out. The focused code failing to reinvest savings is 
associated with the initial codes failing parts of drug courts and pricing people out. The 
focused code non-cooperating defendants is associated with the initial codes failing parts 
of drug courts and pricing people out. As with the focused code creating requirements 
not in statutes, the final focused code of pricing people out is associated with the initial 
codes failing parts of drug courts, needing oversight, and pricing people out. To dispel 
the thought that these two focused codes are measuring precisely the same thing, only the 




Figure 8. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Make Programs Affordable. 
 
Theory 7: Failure to address pre-trial problems 
Pre-trial problems remain unaddressed by reform according to participants. These 
problems include lengthy waits for trial, which themselves are sometimes caused by 
lengthy waits for mental evaluations or crime laboratory reports. This results in a large 
number of persons who are housed in county jails awaiting trial, and it causes a number 
of problems downstream in the criminal justice process. It is the corkscrew at the top of 
the bottle that is causing pressure throughout, and it should be addressed. Unlike the other 
theories, this theory does not deal directly with a statute that has been enacted and 
blocked from implementation. Rather, it deals with an area that is serving as an obstacle 
to the implementation of many other reform measures that address other parts of the 
criminal justice process that are downstream from pre-trial delays.  
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 9. The theory is grounded in 
the focused code missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform. The focused code is built 
from the initial codes missing the mark, need reform for pre-trial issues for speedy trial 
guarantee and believing CJ reform should look differently.  
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Figure 9. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Address Pre-Trial Problems. 
 
Overarching Theory as Applied in MS 
This dissertation sought to answer the following questions:  
Central Question: 
Are there obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform legislation?  
Research Sub-questions: 
1. What are the obstacles? 
2. How do these obstacles function?  
3. Why are they there?   
4. Why are they allowed to persist? 
The main question was posed because the researcher did not want to presume 
there are obstacles, although it was expected there would be. Every participant in the 
study confirmed they exist. As to the first two sub-questions of “what are the obstacles” 
and “how to do these obstacles function,” the 10 focused codes answer these questions. 
These codes (clouding the data; creating requirements not in statutes; failing to buy-in; 
failing to reinvest savings; missing targets (people, programs, and places); missing the 
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mark, needing pre-trial reform; non-cooperating defendants; pricing people out; resisting 
institutions; and suffocating and overwhelming population) identify what the obstacles 
are and the discussions above about the codes explain how they function. As to the last 
two sub-questions of “why are they there” and “why are they allowed to persist,” the 
seven theories developed from the 10 focused codes answer these questions. These 
theories (the failure to convince, failure to hit targets, failure to exercise fidelity to 
statutory language, failure to make data accessible, failure to reinvest, failure to make 
programs affordable, and failure to address pre-trial problems) explain why the 
obstacles are there and answer why they are allowed to persist.   
This information can be synthesized into one overarching theory that potentially 
has more explanatory power for obstacles in Mississippi than any alternative theory. That 
theory is the failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language. Participants observed this 
occurring in numerous places, e.g., drug courts with extra-statutory requirements, earned 
discharge credits, parole violations triggering a return to prison instead of a TVC, 
programs housed at incorrect locations, and programs targeted to incorrect populations. 
Reform programs were applied incorrectly or in some instances were not applied at all. 
Notably, however, there were several instances where implementation failures were 
identified and corrected. The initial poor TVC location is a primary example. Initially, the 
TVC was housed in a prison and this is precisely the place where it is not supposed to be 
held. However, the facility was relocated to a community setting as intended by the 
statute after a visit to the facility by the 585 Task Force and a change in MDOC 
Commissioners. This serves as an example of how policy implementation is dynamic 
instead of static and can course-correct over time.   
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This overarching theory arises directly from the individual theory of failure to 
exercise fidelity to statutory language, but other individual theories such as failure to 
convince, failure to hit targets, failure to reinvest, and failure to make programs 
affordable overlap with and contribute to the problem of not always adhering to statutory 
language or intent. Additionally, it is also supported by several top focused codes 
identified by participants, such as failing to buy-in, failing to reinvest, missing targets 
(people, places, and programs), and resisting institutions. This theory more than any 
other appears to explain implementation failures in those areas where they exist.  
Several visuals help conceptualize this overarching theory and how it functions at 
the ground level. Figure 10 illustrates a situation where a statute creates a reform program 
and its requirements. Later, at the implementation phase, a judge or some other 
government official imposes requirements on program participants that are not in the 
statute or even contemplated by the statute through delegation. Drug courts were an easy 
example of this for participants to discuss because there have been situations over time 
where judges have imposed requirements on participants that had no statutory basis, such 
as bans on dating and taking prescription medications for issues such as depression. This, 
in effect, narrows the reach of the program to a smaller audience than intended by the 
legislature, and this obviously narrows the number of persons who could be positively 




Figure 10. Extra-statutory requirements that burden participation in programs.  
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Figure 11 illustrates the situation where a regulatory or judicial decision narrows 
the scope of a reform statute. An easy to conceptualize example is where judges 
“stacked” technical violations so that they could immediately revoke probation and send 
an inmate to serve the balance of his or her sentence instead of routing the person to a 
TVC.  Another example is when MDOC reportedly discontinued, at least for a time, 




Figure 11. Regulatory or judicial decisions constricting the scope of a reform statute. 
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Yet another illustration of a failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language is 
seen in Figure 12. This represents situations where a statute specified a program be 
located in a particular type of site or target a particular population, yet this was not done. 
For example, the initial location of TVCs in a prison setting is a prime but extreme 
example. Prisons were precisely the location TVCs were designed to avoid because a 
significant supporting rationale for TVCs is that technical violators do not need to be 
exposed to the potentially criminogenic effect of prisons. Drug courts are an easy 
example of targeting incorrect populations when they begin to be used for unintended 
purposes, such as get-out-of-jail-free-cards for well-off college students caught with 
small amounts of marijuana. These courts were intended for persons who face legitimate 
addiction issues that could result in the person having a lifetime of legal problems that 





Figure 12. Applying the reform statute to the wrong location or population. 
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Suggestions for Testing the Theories 
These theories should be tested through future research. Grounded theory is a 
means by which to construct theory, and it does so from the data collected. It attempts to 
construct reliable theories by testing the theories against the data it collects, but it is 
constrained and limited by the very universe of data before it. The universe of data can 
only reach so wide in scope in any given study and while the researcher attempts to 
collect data to the point of saturation, other data might change the analysis. Future 
researchers should test these theories against the data they collect to determine if they, 
too, find these theories helpful explanations of how reform implementation is impeded, or 
if modification or even discarding of the theories is needed.  
The constructs for each theory were provided above in part to aid future 
researchers in these efforts. The initial codes and focused codes that serve as building 
blocks for the theories expressly show how the researcher categorized the data collected 
and “built-up” to theory. The codes were expressly provided to, metaphorically speaking, 
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show future researchers the cookbook for how the dish was made. Future researchers 
using grounded theory to examine reform implementation should determine whether the 
codes constructed in this study from this data also fit the data they collect, or if the codes 
do not fit or they are identifying codes that are different. If the codes constructed in this 
study do not fit their data or if they are identifying additional codes at the initial or 
focused coding level, this may well impact the explanatory power of the theories 
constructed in this study. It may also result in the construction of modified or new 
theories. The use of the codes identified in this study for measurement in future research 
is not limited to interviews in the style of grounded theory. For example, surveys might 
well be used to measure the concepts captured by these codes and assess the strength of 
these theories.  
The point here is not to provide an exhaustive listing and full explanation of the 
ways in which these theories should be tested, but rather to provide some suggestions for 
starting points as to how they could be, and to emphasize that they should be.  
Significance of Research 
How This Research Develops and Extends Prior Academic Research 
Past research has examined implementation failures in a variety of settings. 
Ellickson and Petersilia (1983) was the seminal criminal justice implementation study 
that examined numerous criminal justice innovations across a range of reforms. Smith et 
al. (2012) and Greenwood and Walsh (2012) extended the research of Ellickson and 
Petersilia (1983) by examining the implementation of very specific criminal justice 
policies, with Smith et al. examining the earned discharge program in California aimed at 
reducing supervision time and Greenwood and Walsh examining implementation of the 
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Blueprint for Violence Prevention programs in a number of states. Gottfredson and 
Gottfredson (2002), Fagan & Mihalic (2003), and Mihalic, Fagan, & Argamaso (2008) 
also extended the research of Ellickson and Petersilia (1983), but did so in the 
educational setting with an examination of the implementation of school-based policies.  
This study differs from all of these in both its approach and its intellectual 
product. It differs in approach because it applied constructivist grounded theory to create 
a set of theories to explain how and why obstacles to implementation exist. Past studies 
were generally case studies or reviews of case studies, and the different approach used 
here created a different intellectual product by producing a set of theories that were 
dynamic in nature rather than the static, descriptive factors identified in past studies. The 
theories constructed in this study tell the reader precisely how implementation is being 
obstructed, e.g., failing to exercise fidelity to statutory language, as opposed to 
articulating a listing of static, descriptive categories under which a range of obstructions 
might fall, e.g., insufficient communication, lack of leadership, divisions of authority.  
At least two of the individual theories emanating from this dissertation make their 
own unique claims because of their close tie to the modern criminal justice reform 
movement. The failure to reinvest (Theory 5) and failure to make programs affordable 
(Theory 6) were specific to the way reform was sold to the public on the front-end and 
the corresponding inability to fully implement reform on the back-end. Although general 
discussions about failing to reinvest in justice initiatives are not newly raised by this 
research, the theory in this particular context is new because modern criminal justice 
reform was sold to the public on the very idea that savings would be reinvested and that 
this would, ultimately, return society to a prison population and incarceration rate that 
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more closely resembled the world as it existed before the prison population exploded. 
Now, according to participants, reinvestment is not taking place and it is preventing the 
full implementation of the very reform policies the public was convinced it needed to 
pass into law. The failure to make programs affordable is highly related to this, both 
because reinvestment could be used to make these programs affordable and because 
reform, as it was sold to the public, never hinged on a participant’s ability to pay. 
Two theories that are relatively distinct from the other theories articulated in this 
dissertation are failure to make data accessible (Theory 4) and failure to address pre-trial 
problems (Theory 7). Although a lack of access to data was not identified as a major 
obstacle to implementation in the academic literature reviewed, the participants in this 
study are not the only observers to have identified this as a major issue for criminal 
justice policy (Bach & Travis, 2021, Aug. 16). As Bach and Travis (2021) stated only 
very recently, “Advocates for criminal justice reform from different fields and 
backgrounds are all reaching the same conclusion: Any attempt at real, lasting change 
will require a significant investment in our ability to collect, store, and share data.” The 
failure to address pre-trial problems is not technically a failure to implement a reform 
that has passed the legislature. It is more a reflection of what has not been done that the 
legislature should do. It is mentioned here because it was identified by a now former 
sheriff of a large county as a major oversight of criminal justice reform, and a problem 
that, if it were addressed, could have major ripple effects downstream and positively 
impact other problematic areas.  
There is some overlap between the findings of this study and past ones, as might 
be expected. For example, Theory 1 of this study, failure to convince, overlaps with 
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Ellickson and Petersilia’s (1983) factors of sincere motivation at adoption, top leadership 
support, and director and staff commitment because if these people have not been 
convinced of the merits of reform, they will not have sincere motivation, will not support 
it, and will not be committed to it. But the important point is this study offers 
explanations for why these categories of obstructions exist, and in so doing, adds depth to 
previous research in this area. As another example, for the overarching theory of failure 
to exercise fidelity to statutory language (Theory 3), this dissertation is not the first to 
pronounce that a failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language is a problem in the 
public policy world. Entire texts have been written about the subject (Mears, 2010). 
However, this dissertation theorizes that failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language 
serves as a massive impediment to the implementation of modern-day criminal justice 
reform. If this theory is valid, then the good news is that at least one fix is free. Simply 
apply the statute as intended and the savings from doing so to a state could be substantial. 
This is equally true for the related theory of failure to hit targets (Theory 2) where 
policies fail to hit entire populations for which they were intended. This ties directly into 
the next subsection and discussion, which is why this research matters to non-academic 
criminal justice professionals.  
Why This Research Matters to Non-Academic Criminal Justice Professionals 
To harken back to a quote provided in the literature review, it is not that the 
reform “did not work,” but that it “did not happen” (Van Voorhis, Cullen, & Applegate, 
1995, p. 20). It would be a vast overstatement to proclaim that criminal justice reform in 
Mississippi, writ large, “did not happen” because it was not implemented correctly. In 
many ways it has been. However, participants identified specific areas where reform was 
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not implemented as intended either by mistake of the person in charge or by design when 
the person disagreed with some aspect of reform. In these particular instances, the reform, 
in effect, “did not happen.” Cherry-picking which parts of a policy to implement matters. 
As Duwe and Clark (2015) have shown, the difference between 80% of a policy being 
implemented versus 20% is often determinative of whether the policy works at all. That 
is to say, when a gatekeeper cherry-picks from a policy to implement only those portions 
he or she agrees with, the consequence is often that the policy does not work. That is the 
bad news, and practitioners should be aware of it. The good news is that as a practical 
matter, perhaps the most promising aspect of a theory that failure to exercise fidelity to 
statutory language has been such a moving force is that the cost to fix it is absolutely free 
in real dollars. This is the biggest take-away for the practitioner from this dissertation. A 
big impact can be made, and made relatively quickly, through simple application of 
statutes as they were intended to be applied and without playing games to circumvent 
their true intent. 
A failure to make data accessible, failure to reinvest, failure to make programs 
affordable, and failure to address pre-trial problems will all cost real dollars. While a 
failure to reinvest might be viewed by some as not costing anything because it is merely 
taking money saved by reform and directing it back into programs aimed at reducing the 
size of the incarcerated population, others will likely take a different view. As one 
participant who is active in legislative reform efforts for a think tank noted, there is a 
belief among decision-makers that the state already contributes a significant sum 
annually to the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Any request that includes 
additional funds is almost destined to fail, at least according to this participant, and 
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others. Some might object to using reform savings to expand programs as a back-door 
method of expanding the size of government beyond that which existed before criminal 
penalties became more punitive in the 1980s and gave rise to larger prison populations. 
The argument from this perspective would be that all that is required today is a rollback 
of the punitive nature of some penalties, and not an investment in services aimed towards 
policy objectives such as reducing recidivism. Such an investment in services, the 
argument would go, would put an obligation on the state that it never had before the rise 
of punitive incarceration. All of this is to say that proponents should be prepared to make 
a case for why front-end cost increases will result in back-end savings, and why the 
expansion of government services in this area is a prudent use of taxpayer dollars that 
will realistically reduce the size of the incarcerated population through reduced offense 






CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION 
The United States has an incarceration rate and prison population that exceed 
other liberal democracies and most other nations around the world. This has gained 
significant attention over the past two decades and is often referred to in terms of mass 
incarceration or overincarceration. Criminal justice reform has been identified as one way 
to address this issue, and it has risen in popularity across numerous states. This 
dissertation used constructivist grounded theory to develop a set of theories to explain 
obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform in Mississippi. Mississippi was 
chosen as the study setting because the state has been recognized as a leader in enacting 
criminal justice reform legislation and it has one of the highest incarceration rates in the 
nation that has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world (FWD.us, 2020). 
Therefore, since criminal justice reform seeks to address overincarceration, Mississippi 
has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world, and the state is a leader in reform 
efforts, it would seem to reason that reform could have a significant impact in the state.  
Implementation evaluations have been performed with far less frequency than 
outcome evaluations, even though it is widely recognized that implementation affects 
outcomes. The implementation evaluations that exist do not provide a general consensus 
regarding factors that hinder implementation. While implementation evaluations such as 
Duwe & Clark (2015), Ellickson and Petersilia (1983), Greenwood & Welsh (2012), and 
Smith et al. (2012) provided a framework for this research, those studies were case 
studies or studies evaluating case studies and were not directly aimed towards theory 
building. This study was, and it used constructivist grounded theory to do so.  
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There have not been any studies identified that used grounded theory to develop a 
set of theories about obstacles to the implementation of recent criminal justice reform. 
Because this dissertation did, it contributes to the extant literature by offering a set of 
theories that identify for policymakers and future researchers obstacles to the 
implementation of reform that could occur in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, it provides 
depth to the findings of previous researchers, such as Ellickson and Petersilia (1983), and 
it offers new theories for why reform efforts are hindered and what to do about it.  
Seven theories were formed by applying Charmaz’s (2014) constructivist version 
of grounded theory: (1) failure to convince, (2) failure to hit targets, (3) failure to 
exercise fidelity to statutory language, (4) failure to make data accessible, (5) failure to 
reinvest, (6) failure to make programs affordable, and (7) failure to address pre-trial 
problems. Failure to convince reflected persons and institutions who hindered 
implementation because they were not convinced of its necessity or benefit. Failure to hit 
targets symbolized policies and programs directed towards the wrong people, that use the 
wrong programs, or are enacted at the wrong location. Failure to exercise fidelity to 
statutory language represented imposing requirements not found in the statutes such that 
it made it more difficult for persons to participate in a reform program or benefit from a 
reform policy. Failure to make data accessible captured the notion that there is a lack of 
data needed to make reliable assessments about implementation and outcomes.  Failure 
to reinvest was based on the idea the state should reinvest savings realized from reform 
back into areas that impact criminal justice, such as hiring more parole and probation 
officers, financing participation in reform programs that otherwise rely on fees, or 
addressing pre-trial problems and delays not yet addressed by reform. Failure to make 
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programs affordable signified instances where some persons could not afford to 
participate in reform programs because of fees. Finally, failure to address pre-trial 
problems reflected the failure of reform efforts to address the significant problems that 
occur before trial occurs, such as delays in mental health evaluations and laboratory 
reports.  
An overarching theory was identified that had the potential to best explain 
implementation obstacles in Mississippi. This was a failure to exercise fidelity to 
statutory language. Participants discussed several examples of reform not being 
implemented with fidelity to the text or intent of legislation and the result was that reform 
programs did not operate as intended. The reasons for this varied. Sometimes it was 
because a program was hosted in the incorrect location, such as when TVCs were initially 
placed at a correctional facility. Other times it was because the reach of reform legislation 
was “narrowed” by persons with authority adding extra-statutory requirements for 
participation in reform programs. The researcher found additional support for identifying 
this as an overarching theory based upon its overlap with the theories of failure to 
convince, failure to hit targets, failure to reinvest, and failure to make programs 
affordable. Each of these theories contributed to the problem of not always adhering to 
statutory language or intent.  
It is notable that on some occasions, implementation obstacles were identified and 
remedied. This is consistent with Ellickson and Petersilia’s (1983) opinion that 
implementation is a process, not static event, and improvements to implementation can be 
made over time. An example of this is when judges “stacked” technical violations of 
parole to end-run a reform statute that attempted to decrease the number of persons who 
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were sent back to prison for technical violations. In that case, the Legislature passed an 
additional bill, H.B. 387, that clarified that a revocation comprised of one or more 
technical violations counted as only one technical violation. This can be the difference 
between 90 days at a TVC and serving the balance of a suspended sentence.  
This research is limited because it is uses one state as a study setting and it is 
located in a particular geographic region of a large country. While it is theorized the 
experience of Mississippi can be extrapolated to other states in other regions, “all 
criminal justice is local,” as the saying goes, and there may be factors present in other 
jurisdictions that diminish or discard with considerations that were present in this setting.  
There is also an inherent limitation to grounded theory that is recognized by 
Charmaz (2014). That is, grounded theory is limited by the very perspectives of the 
participants upon which the researcher relies and the researcher’s interpretation and 
recording of them. When participants provide observations, they can only relay the world 
as they see it, but not all persons in the same situation would interpret the information the 
same or even necessarily observe the same things. This is why, for example, although eye 
witness testimony in criminal trials is the primary type of evidence offered against 
defendants, it frequently provides unreliable and conflicting information and has been 
cited as the number one reason for wrongful convictions (Scheck, et al., 2003). People 
see things differently and sometimes inaccurately. Similarly, when participants provide 
observations to the researcher, not every researcher will necessarily interpret and record 
these observations in the same way.  
The research was additionally limited by having less prosecutors and inmates 
participate than persons from other groups. The researcher concluded this was a 
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limitation more of optics than substance. The difference in numbers of participants 
between prosecutors and policymakers, judges and administrators, and defenders was not 
large. There were four prosecutors but seven policymakers and seven defenders. Judges 
and administrators were closer with five. It was the researcher’s impression that 
prosecutors as a group were less willing to participate in research of this nature, while 
defenders and policymakers participated with enthusiasm. Perhaps this should not come 
as a surprise given the nature of what the groups do professionally, e.g., it is often the 
case the defenders see problems with the system because they are charged with defending 
persons against a system that is accusing their clients of a crime or crimes. While only 
one inmate participated, his participation was viewed more as a bonus than presenting a 
problem of having only one inmate participant. It was entirely unanticipated there would 
be any inmate participants, but an opportunity presented itself during the course of the 
research to interview such a person. That said, his presence presents an issue with an 
imbalance in participants, and future research may focus more on the perspectives of 
persons who have personally been on the receiving end of criminal legal enforcement.   
This segues directly into recommendations for future research, particularly those 
applying grounded theory to discover implementation obstacles to reform. In addition to 
potentially seeking more participants from the prosecutor and inmate groups, future 
researchers may also want to examine specific programs. This research examined 
implementation from a more global view by examining state-wide criminal justice 
legislation regardless of a specific program or policy. The thought is that what is true at a 
general level is likely also true at a specific level and that the results of this general level 
research can inform efforts to implement specific policies. Future research might examine 
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specific areas of reform to learn about a particular area at a more granular level and to 
transport those lessons to other specific areas. For example, in a jurisdiction such as 
Mississippi where drug courts have largely been adopted, the implementation of drug 
court statutes could be examined as a research project in and of itself. So, too, could the 
implementation of statutes regarding TVCs, and other specific areas of reform. Although 
the examination of specific programs would look more like some past implementation 
research, applying grounded theory could set it apart and yield meaningful information 
not previously discovered.   
Finally, future researchers should test the theories formed from this research and 
dissertation. Although this researcher tested the theories against the data obtained from 
interviews for this study, future researchers should test the theories against the data they 
collect. It is through the continual process of research and testing that we shall learn more 
about how to successfully remove obstacles to the implementation of reform and criminal 









APPENDIX B – Interview Guide 
1. What is your place of employment, title, and responsibilities? 
2. What do you know about criminal justice reform in Mississippi? 
3. Where have you seen it work well? 
4. Have you seen it not work well in any areas?  
5. Have you seen any barriers or obstacles to implementation of reform?  
6. What are they? 
7. How do they function as barriers or obstacles?  
8. Why do they serve as barriers or obstacles? 
9. Are the barriers or obstacles allowed to persist? 
10. If so, why?  
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APPENDIX C – Codebook 
Code Definition Example Quotation 
Balancing “The Reformer 
Dilemma” 
When faced with a 
situation to correct, 
reformer activists must 
always ask if seeking the 
solution will result not in 
achieving the solution but 
rather an even worse reality 
than the present, e.g., a 
program will not be fixed 
to address the perceived 
problem, but will be 
discarded in its entirety 
resulting in no one being 
helped at all.  
“It kind of puts the 
reformers in a bad position 
because, you know, you 
run the risk of, if you try to 
fix this, you run the risk of 
eliminating these programs 
in places. And so it’s a 
tough question. Do you 
want to deny this 
opportunity to people who 
can afford it, you know, 
which might be the right 
thing to do, just to ensure 
that it’s supplied equally? 
You do run the risk of 
eliminating it for 
everybody.” 
Believing CJ reform 
should look differently 
A belief that reform 
measures are not 
addressing the key issues, 
lacking substance, missing 
their target audience, or are 
in some other way 
deficient.  
“But honestly, one of the 
biggest policy changes that 
I think would really benefit 
the criminal justice system 
would be to a switch to 
appointed prosecutors and 
appointed sheriffs.” 
Believing in CJ goals that 
conflict with reform 
A belief the criminal justice 
system should have goals 
that directly conflict with 
the spirit and goals of 
reform.  
“That's what that’s what a 
lot of this comes down to 
is that, you know, there’s a 
constituency of people 
who are just reflexively 
against any sort of criminal 
justice reform. Within the 
legislature, I think those 
are pretty small, outside, 
but they're able to 
leverage, they’re able to 
leverage some powerful 
interest groups, like law 
enforcement and sheriffs 
onto their side. And, and 




Code Definition Example Quotation 
Branding system as 
“criminal legal system” 
A belief the term “criminal 
justice system” is a 
misnomer, and a more 
accurate descriptor would 
be “criminal legal system.”  
“We have a criminal legal 
system. We don't have a 
criminal justice system.” 
Challenging bureaucratic 
hurdles 
The existence of 
bureaucratic roadblocks to 
persons within the system 
that make reentry more 
difficult, e.g., not getting a 
driver’s license before 
release.  
“And these sounds so 
trivial, and yet they’re so 
important. Getting a 
person who’s released a 
driver’s license or an ID 
card. That sounds small, 
but people usually can't 
find work if they don't 
have that.” 
Clouding the data This refers to lack of access 
to data at the state or local 
level either because it is not 
shared or because it does 
not exist. 
“The problem with that is 
the databases out there for 
ascertaining what’s going 
on at the Justice Court 
level and municipal court 
level and county court 
level are not that good.” 
Confusing inconsistency 
across jurisdictions 
Program rules that vary by 
jurisdiction. Drug courts 
are a prominent example of 
this.  
“So, one, drug courts help 
a lot of people and that 
they provide an alternative 
for somebody who would 
otherwise be facing a 
felony, and go into prison. 
And so that's a good thing, 
don't want to take that 
away from anybody. Um, 
they operate differently, 
depending on what 
jurisdiction you're in. 
Some judges take this very 
seriously and do a great 
job with it. Some don't, 
and don't really care.” 
Creating requirements not 
in statutes 
This refers to requirements 
imposed on persons during 
their participation in some 
reform measure or program 
when the requirements are 
not found in the statute, i.e., 
“I asked them for copies of 
their rules and regulations 
and the individual rules 
that they had for people, 
some of them are just silly, 
like, you can’t date without 
permission from the judge, 
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extra-statutory 
requirements. 
can’t get married without 





Judicial resistance to 
reform on the basis the 
judge’s personal experience 
leads him or her to disagree 
with reform. 
“The other side of the 
obstacle was there was a 
lot of resistance from 
judges. We had one judge 
who declared the TVC 
program and limits that the 





Opposition to reform on the 
basis it will curtail 
prosecutorial discretion in 
how to prosecute or 
recommend the sentence 
for a crime. 
“The prosecutors’ ideal 
paradigm is that they can, 
you know, charge 
everyone with the death 
sentence and then back off 
of that, because their view 
is, look, I’m the 
prosecutor. I know what’s 
right. And so the laws need 
to give me maximum 
punitive authority. Because 
if I have maximum 
punitive authority, then I 
can do what I feel is right. 
And if the lawmakers 
don’t give me maximum 
punitive authority, then 
there may be a situation 
that comes down the pike, 
where I believe somebody 
needs something that I’m 
not allowed to give them.” 
Delaying on TVCs This captures an 
institutional bandwidth 
issue. The concept for 
TVCs was in the 
legislation, but the 
institutional infrastructure 
to handle the target 
population was not. This 
also captures the idea that 
“Initially, there were a lot 
of problems with the 
TVCs, and that they just 
looked more like jails than 
anything else. And, you 
know, the intent of those is 
to actually be more of a 
halfway house type 
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some judges have searched 
for ways around sending 
inmates to TVCs so that 
they can instead be sent 
back to prison.  
situation. I think they do 
look more like that now.” 
Disagreeing with a reform 
measure 
A disagreement with a 
statutory change made by 
reform legislation.  
“The eligibility for drug 
court isn’t pretty. It used to 
be pretty strict to get in. 
And what they’ve done is 
they’ve removed all the 
barriers now….You can be 
a drug dealer…And that’s, 
that’s the worst idea. 
That’s like a fox in the 
henhouse.” 
Disagreeing with program 
purpose 
A belief that a program has 
an unneeded purpose or a 
purpose that runs contrary 
to the person's belief about 
what should be the goals of 
the criminal justice system.  
“So there’s not like a, a 
consensus on what we’re 
even talking about when 
we’re talking about justice, 
reinvestment or reentry 
programs.” 
Disagreeing with program 
substance 
A belief a program should 
be administered or taught 
in a substantively different 
way. 
“The RRP program that 
was supposed to take over, 
you know, all the research 
points to doing these 
recidivism reduction 
programs outside of an 
institution. But what it 
really became was just a 
substitute for RID, you 
know, it was RID without 
push-ups.” 
Diverting crises and mental 
health from jail 
Programs that have treated 
persons and situations 
outside of the traditional 
arrest and incarceration 
approach.  
“So, again, the whole law 
enforcement community in 
the county is part of this 
program. So that’s one tool 
that we can use. So we’re 
not shipping somebody 
that needs mental health 
help to the jail.” 
Exercising racism The idea that racism shapes 
views about the criminal 
justice system and 
receptivity to reform.  
“In some ways, I don’t 
think you can separate the 
conversation about race 
from criminal justice 
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reform in a state like 
Mississippi with the 
highest African American 
population.” 
Failing parts of drug courts Extra-statutory 
requirements of drug courts 
around the state that have 
limited or damaged their 
effectiveness.  
“And that goes back to 
how long should a drug 
court be? Right? The 
science is very clear. We 
should be sitting at 18 
months to two years. Well, 
that’s not what the drug 
courts in Mississippi do.” 
Failing to reinvest savings The notion that the 
legislature's failure to take 
savings realized as a result 
of reforms and reinvest 
them into criminal justice 
related programs, such as 
mental health and drug 
courts, has hindered full 
implementation of existing 
reforms. 
“And by the way, 
Department of Corrections, 
since 585, has gone from 
24,000 down to 17,000 
inmates at a savings of I 
can’t recall the specific 
savings, but it is multiple 
millions. Unfortunately, 
we wanted those millions 
and savings to put back 
into corrections where we 
need it. But that didn't 
happen.” 
Fearing crime The very fear of crime, 
violent and non-violent, 
can motivate some persons 
to hinder reform 
implementation.   
“Fear is a big problem.” 
Fearing people on drugs The fear that some persons 
have of other persons who 
use drugs.  
“There are a lot of people 
who are just afraid of 
drugs. And there are a lot 
of people who think our 
drug laws actually prevent 
people from doing drugs.” 
Ignoring reentry The notion the state has 
failed to take reentry 
seriously and therefore has 
failed to dedicate 
meaningful programming 
to those preparing to 
reenter society.  
“There’s not a whole lot to 
talk about when it comes 
to just programming that 
the state does related to 
reentry. I mean, the 
Department of Corrections, 
for the most part, gives 
people $25 and a bus 
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ticket. And that’s, that’s 
basically it.” 
Injecting disruptive change 
into the system with 
reform 
The idea that reform itself 
can create hurdles to 
administering justice 
efficiently, such as when 
crimes previously 
designated as felonies are 
recategorized as 
misdemeanors, which 
pushes the handling of 
these offenses down to 
local governments and 
potentially overburdens and 
even overwhelms them.  
“There was a lot of 
concern about, you know, 
you’re not doing 
something about crime, 
you’re just making these 
property crimes 
misdemeanors, and the 
theory was that going to be 
a huge burden on the local 
governments because 
they’re not going to go to 
prison, they’re gonna sit in 
the jail at the county 
expense or the city 
expense.” 
Institutional resistance Sectors within the criminal 
justice apparatus opposing 
a change injected by reform 
because it will modify their 
authority or responsibility 
in some way. 
“I would say the biggest 
constituency that’s 
opposed to almost all of 
these stuff, all this stuff is 
prosecutors and district 
attorneys, you know, they 
generally are reflexively 
against any sort of criminal 
justice reform that comes 
out of the legislature or 




A program that is too 
“thin” on program 
substance, e.g., a program 
where not much is taught, 
is entirely too short, etc.  
“That’s one of the biggest 
obstacles, you know, what 
the problem is with these 
we now called intervention 
courts, that I see is that 
they’re really good at 
supervision, but not really 
good at support, or, or 
treatment.” 
Lacking systematic or 
scientific rigor 
The failure to adopt 
performance measures or 
evidence-based standards.   
“And it was just ridiculous. 
They had, they had one 
large room, which was the 
classroom, and they had it 
partitioned. And you had 
four classes going at the 
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same time. And it just, it 
wasn't, it was just a 
holding place for 90 days 
that they got some 
lectures.” 
Leading (or not) with 
leadership 
The idea that leadership 
matters and sets the tone, 
and that there have been 
shifts in policy emphasis 
with changing leadership. 
“I think top leadership is 
because top leadership sets 
the tone. Okay, what are 
we about? They're the ones 
who get to look at the 
mission of the agency and 
say, Look, the statute says 
this, this, this, but this is 
what we're going to 
emphasize, these are the 
most important things that 
we do. And burl is talking 
about preparing people for 
reentry. And I don't 
remember Chris ever 
talking about [that].” 
Leaning Lady Justice More resources are 
provided to the district 
attorney offices than public 
defender offices.  
“But in all honesty, 
criminal justice reform 
starts with fully funding 
the public defenders 
throughout the state and 
making full time offices 
circuit-wide to parallel that 
of the DAs office. That’s 
where justice happens.” 
Locating programs in the 
wrong environment 
Programs hosted in 
environments in which they 
were not intended to be 
hosted.  
“But it’s inside the 
institution, it really isn’t 
fulfilling a purpose of 
being an alternative to 
sentencing people to an 
institution read was, in 
theory, an alternative.” 
Mimicking others’ models The notion that Mississippi 
will borrow programs that 
work from other states and 
implement them here rather 
than attempt to recreate the 
wheel.  
“And basically, rather than 
reinvent the wheel, we sort 
of plagiarized are pretty 
good a lot with their 
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Missing marks on 
revocation reform 
These were set-backs in the 
implementation of 
revocation reform 
measures, such as housing 
a TVC in a prison instead 
of a community setting, and 
the ways some judges 
sought to still revoke for 
technical violations by 
aggressive interpretations 
of revocation statutes.  
“That’s the thing that I 
want to emphasize is that 
judges are continuing to 
get it find ways to get 
around these graduated 
penalties of 90 days, 120 
days, and then the balance 
of this suspended 
sentence.” 
Missing the mark, need 
reform for pre-trial issues 
for speedy trial guarantee 
Reform has been directed 
towards crime-level 
categorization (felony v. 
misdemeanor), sentence 
length, and at the stage of 
incarceration through 
release. This code 
represents the argument 
that more reform should be 
directed towards pre-trial 
issues, such as taking steps 
necessary to ensure 
defendants receive a speedy 
trial, receive a timely 
mental health examination, 
receive a timely crime lab 
report in a murder 
investigation, etc.   
“What I would like to see, 
though, is more attention 
paid to what happens pre-
trial…Like we got people 
down in detention center 
now has been down there 
more than 1000 days. 
Right. Which I think 
according to the 
Constitution, that’s a clear 
violation, you know, 
speedy trial, promise that 
you get as an American 
citizen…So the criminal 
justice reform, most of the 
parts that I hear, it has to 
do with people that are 
already incarcerated…I’d 
like to see more with pre-
trial detainees.” 
Missing the target audience Applying a program to the 
wrong people. 
“Well, the drug court is, 
though as the way it was 
originally, originally 
designed, and the way that 
I think it’s trying to be 
pushed there by the 
Administrative Office of 
courts, is that it is an 
alternative sentencing. And 
it’s a court of last resort. 
What I mean by that is if I 
get charged with 
possession of cocaine, or 
 
121 
Code Definition Example Quotation 
possession of meth, or 
even possession of 
marijuana, because we still 
we still charge people with 
felony possession of 
marijuana. Those people if 
they’re a first-time 
offender, they’re not 
supposed to be in drug 
court, unless they have 
some type of record or 
pattern where they need to 
be in drug court.” 
Misunderstanding reform Areas where 
misunderstandings of 
reform cause people to 
oppose it from distrust or to 
implement it in a way that 
does not correspond with 
the intent of the reform.  
“I mean, I think a lot of 
these sheriffs and police 
chiefs when you sit down 
and actually go through, 
you know, the actual 
content of these policies 
and what they’re intended 
to do and how they’re 
implemented, you don’t 
meet a lot of objection. I 
think that they are 
leveraged by a lot of 
people who are just 
opposed to it in any form.” 
Needing oversight Programs that needed 
oversight from a person or 
body so that they could be 
held to evidence-based 
practices or as close to 
evidence-based as 
possible.  
“Some judges take this 
very seriously and do a 
great job with it. Some 
don’t, and don’t really 
care. And, um, the 
Supreme Court is charged 
with certifying them and 
applying best practices. In 
my view, they’ve been 
negligent in that duty and 
have allowed judges to just 
basically not run drug 
court and just pocket the 
money they’re getting 
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Non-cooperating 
defendants 
Some defendants do not 
want to participate in 
alternative reform 
programs and instead prefer 
to be incarcerated. 
“And also they’re kind of 
smart, too. They know 
how much time is over 
their head, and they can 
figure it out. If they got 
two years left on drug 
court, I mean, they don’t 
like, you can’t have any 
fun, you can’t get cranky, 
you can’t do anything. You 
gotta be, you have to work. 
You have to be in bed at a 
certain time. You have 
ankle monitors and all that. 
No one wants it…They’d 
rather go to a year in 
prison or less than to do 
two years of having to live 
with drug court. So are 
there people that would 
rather do that? Yeah, 
there’s a lot of people like 
that. And they know they 
can calculate their head.” 
Overloading probation and 
parole officers 
So many persons are 
assigned to probation and 
parole officers that it is 
impossible the officers 
could contribute a 
sufficient amount of time to 
each person to whom they 
are assigned.  
“I’ll be frank, you want to 
talk about something 
doesn’t work, probation 
and parole don’t work. 
That does not work. It's a 
mathematical 
impossibility…if you run 
the math, I would be 
curious how many people 
each agent is assigned to 
supervise. It has to be 
hundreds. It has to be in 
the hundreds if you just 
look at the population that 
is technically on parole or 
probation…say you have 
300, 400 people on your 
docket as an agent that you 
have to get reports from 
every month, and there’s 
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only 20 working days in a 
month. You’re talking 20 
people per day.” 
PEERing oversight In addition to its normal 
role oversight duties, PEER 
has a specific oversight role 
over criminal justice reform 
in Mississippi through its 
seat on the HB 585 Task 
Force.  
“The people who drafted 
585 and crafted the section 
on the taskforce decided to 
make give the pier 
committee staff a position 
on the task force.” 
Politicking and perceptions 
of political power 
The perceptions of different 
groups about the political 
power and allegiances of 
other groups and how that 
impacts the discourse 
around reform.  
“But the only frustrating 
thing to me about criminal 
justice reform is we, the 
people who work within 
the system, they don't want 
to hear from us. They want 
to, they want to tell us how 
it's going to be. And that’s 
fine. We’ll follow the law. 
But the problem is, they 
don't understand the reality 
of some of this.” 
Preventing parole for 
violent offenders 
There is a 
misunderstanding about 
how H.B. 585 applies to 
violent offenders. It does 
not apply at 50% of 
sentence served as sold and 
commonly thought, even 
by criminal defense 
lawyers.  
“A lot of people rather 
than reading the statutes, 
read some newspaper 
reports about this 50% 
rule. Yeah, and started 
telling their clients if 
you're convicted of a 
violent crime, you can be 
released after 50%. When 
in fact, what it did is it just 
raised the floor for all 
violent criminals, and it 
had no impact on the 
people who are ineligible. 
So, you know, armed 
robbery was a day for day 
sentence before 585 is a 
day for day sentence after 
585.” 
Pricing people out This is when some persons 
are priced-out of 
participating in reform 
“So you have to pay to get 
into drug court. In 
Mississippi, you have 
 
124 
Code Definition Example Quotation 
programs because they 
cannot afford the fees.  
monthly fees, you have to 
pay for all your testing that 
you have to do. If you can't 
afford it, then you’re not 
in. Um, and so some drug 
courts managed to make 
that more equitable by, you 
know, the judges get to 
operate this fund however 
they choose. And so a lot 
of them use it to cover 
their expenses, and then 
create scholarships with 
what’s left to allow folks 
who can’t afford to get in. 
Some don’t do that and sit 
on the money or spend it 
for other reasons. In my 
mind, this is a prime 
example of what the 
Supreme Court should be 
doing and going in and 
saying, hey, look, if your 
numbers don’t reflect the 
people who are actually 
charged with these 
offenses, then you’re 
opening yourself up to a 
federal lawsuit for you 
know, an equal protection 
violation which has been 
threatened over this.” 
Protecting their financial 
interests 
Actors within the criminal 
justice apparatus that 
hinder reform or thwart 
potential reform because it 
is believed it will threaten a 
financial self-interest.  
“One of the biggest 
obstacles to any kind of 
change, and it's not just the 
criminal justice system, 
but since that's where I 
spend my whole life, I see 
it in the criminal justice 
system, is that, you know, 
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Protecting turf Actors within the system 
who oppose a measure or 
program because it will 
affect their domain. 
“And it all comes back 
down in my opinion to 
money and power.” 
Recategorizing non-drug 
non-violent offenses 
Discussions concerning the 
recategorization of many 
non-drug, non-violent 
offenses from felony to 
misdemeanor.  
“If we want to change this, 
just be talking if we want 
to change, in my opinion, 
it doesn’t happen by 
decriminalizing criminal 
activity is sort of like 
saying, we’ve solved 
drunk driving by raising 
the blood alcohol limit. 2.3 
You know, it’s like, hey, 
DUIs have fallen off. 90%. 
But there's still drugs out 
there on the road, you 
know what I mean? But, 
but, but they’ll stand up 
and beat their chests and 
think that they’ve done 
something. And what I 
have found is it just creates 
a more revolving door with 
this 25% with, you know, 
all this other stuff that 
they’re implementing 
changes for. So, you know, 
we don’t need to 
decriminalize acts to solve 
the crime problem. In fact, 
that only harms the 
innocent people. That 
harms the people out there 
who haven’t done anything 
to anyone they become 
prey for, for these folks.” 
Reducing drug sentences to 
be more “fair” 
The idea, generally 
supported, that past drug 
laws had sentences that 
were too severe and varied 
by drug in ways that 
resulted in substantial 
“And, and when we start 
talking about 585, you’ll 
see the huge reform 585 
was when it came to 
sentences, especially drugs 
sentences. You know, 
before if you had cocaine, 
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sentence differentials by 
race.  
it could be a rock of 
cocaine, it could be five 
pounds of cocaine, you’re 
going away for 30 years, 
you had to 85% of it. 
When, when this came out, 
House Bill 585, it 
significantly changed it, it 
made it more fair, it went 
ahead and made it weight 
based. And so that was 
really the big thing.” 
Resisting the extra work 
created by reform 
Some persons may oppose 
or hinder the 
implementation of reform 
on the basis it imposes 
extra work with no 
additional pay.  
“But I think a judge 
doesn’t get paid an extra 
dime for doing this. I get 
no more money than if I 
didn’t have a drug court…I 
like to do it. But drug court 
will take a minimum of 
20% of my time. And I 
think I’m conservative 
there. Because it does. You 
just got it. You either do it 
because it’s a calling or 
you like it and you believe 
it’s helping your society or 
not.” 
Starving for dollars Resources matter, and a 
lack of funds can prevent a 
program from being 
implemented.  
“I mean, the state spends a 
lot of money from a 
percentage basis on 
corrections already. And 
it's a tough sell to argue for 
reinvestment and any sort 
of reentry programming or 
drug court.” 
 
“Yeah, the second thing 
we run into is that there’s 
no, there’s no real funding 
out there in Mississippi for 




The notion the sheer size of 
a population is such that the 
successful implementation 
“Well, you just got to, I 
mean, you try to give 
everybody their day in 
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of any policy that is 
supposed to address that 
population is very difficult.  
court and you try to you 
try to hear both sides and 
stuff. But then there’s 
some days it’s just you’re 
trying to move people 
through the system as fast 
as you can and be fair, it’s 
difficult.” 
Surviving the Willie 
Horton effect 
It only takes one bad case 
with significant media 
attention to potentially 
derail a reform measure 
that is a net positive.  
“But I think part of the 
problem people in the 
criminal justice system 
face is this. It's so easy for 
the press to pick out one or 
two incidents, and really 
kill a program.” 
Turning Points / Hooks for 
Change 
The idea that incarcerated 
persons need a hook on 
which to hang a turning 
point for their life. 
“But listen, I'm not gonna 
church it up too much. 
Because I did have a heavy 
drug problem. I wasn’t 
doing the right things in 
my life. You know, my, 
my mom who loved me 
dearly and was giving up 
on me, you know, I was 
working my lawyer to 
death for seven years, you 
know. So, you know, it’s 
not like I was leading 
church services or 
anything like that all. I 
deserved to go to prison, 
honestly, if you if you 
want me to say that. 
Because, you know, a lot 
of the things that I did, I 
got away with, you know. I 
was I was trying to support 
a drug habit that had taken 
me down dark roads. I 
didn’t have God in my life, 
I just, I wasn’t a good 
person at all, you know, I 
wasn’t necessarily a bad 
person, but I just wasn’t 
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making right decisions. 
And it’s for me, it’s about 
that conscious contact with 
God. And when I’m when 
I’m still in my body with 
drugs and alcohol and 
other substances, I don’t 
have that, you know, cuts 
off. So it’s not like I was 
this demon child, I just 
didn’t have God in my 
life.” 
Viewing skeptically 
because of experience 
The experience of persons 
in the field causes some to 
be skeptical of some reform 
measures. 
“I've been doing it since 
‘97. Probably the only law 
I need to ever do is 
criminal law. And so I’ve 
seen it, you know, the 
pendulum swings, you 
know, we’re gonna get 
tough on crime. And then 
jails go up. Now we’re 
gonna let everybody out 
and then the crime starts 




APPENDIX D – Coding Process 
The process begins by applying initial codes to the testimony of participants. This 
is performed when the researcher is reviewing the transcript of a participant’s testimony. 
In this study, the researcher used Atlas.ti to review transcripts and apply codes. Initial 
codes are the building blocks from which focused codes are constructed, and focused 
codes serve as building blocks for the resulting theories. To demonstrate this process, 
provided below are example quotations that were assigned to the initial codes pricing 
people out and missing the target audience. Following these example quotations is a brief 
description of how these initial codes fit within focused codes and how these focused 
codes serve as building blocks for theory. These examples are intended to serve as brief 
illustrations of how the researcher moved from interview transcripts to initial codes to 
focused codes to theory.  
The initial code pricing people out is defined as when some persons are priced-
out of participating in reform programs because they cannot afford the fees. Three 
example quotations for this initial code are as follows: 
Quotation 1: There are huge racial disparities. You are much more likely 
to get into drug court if you are white. If you look at counties that have a 
pretty equal balance racially, you’ll see most people who get charged with 
drug offenses are African American. There’s a huge disparity there. You 
see more people charged with drug offenses from the African American 
community. That’s not new. But when you look at the people who make it 
to drug court, it’s completely flipped. I mean, it’s like 60% white people 
who get into drug court, and a lot of that is just a reflection of poverty. 
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You have to pay to get into drug court. In Mississippi, you have monthly 
fees. You have to pay for all your testing that you have to do. If you can’t 
afford it, then you’re not in. Some drug courts managed to make that more 
equitable by, you know, the judges get to operate this fund however they 
choose. And so a lot of them use it to cover their expenses, and create 
scholarships with what’s left to allow folks who can’t afford it to get in. 
Some don’t do that and sit on the money or spend it for other reasons. 
Quotation 2: But then you turn around and look at 63% of people in drug 
court [are white]. And nobody could explain that. And I think that when 
you when you start looking at drug court and finding out all the fees, some 
of them were mandatory. They’ve made a way put a waiver in giving the 
judge authority to waive fees. There were people that if you had the 
money to pay for your assessment, you pay to get in. If you need to and 
can pay for treatment, and then you could get in drug court. And if you 
couldn’t do that, then you couldn’t get in drug court. So it wasn’t a thing 
that drug court administrators were saying, you know, we don’t like black 
people. We’re not going to let you in. It was all the system was built up in 
a way that it was just going to be impossible for most of the black 
defendants to get in. 
Quotation 3: If I’m putting you in a drug court, are you going get the 
treatment you need? Well, yeah, but you’re going to have to pay for that. 
And can you pay for that? It’s a pay to play type situation in 
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Mississippi…Some of the drug courts, you know, if you don't have the 
money to get in, you’re not getting in. Period. 
The initial code pricing people out was one of the building blocks for the focused 
code by the same name, pricing people out. Like the initial code, the focused code of 
pricing people out reflected the idea that some persons are priced-out of participating in 
reform programs because they cannot afford the fees. This focused code was one of the 
building blocks for the Theory of Failure to Make Programs Affordable, which is the 
theory is that reform will not be fully implemented if potential participants cannot enroll 
in programs because of cost-prohibitive fees. The through-line for this process would 
look as follows: initial code - pricing people out → focused code - pricing people out → 
Theory of Failure to Make Programs Affordable.  
The initial code missing targets is defined as applying a program to the wrong 
people. Three example quotations for the initial code are as follows: 
Quotation 1: Court and the focus of drug court has never been to get 
people clean and sober. The focus of drug court has always been to reduce 
recidivism and prevent crime. That’s why we have it. We don’t have it to 
monitor these people for 5, 6, 7 years to make sure they’re not relapsing. 
Because you can certainly relapse in alcohol or drugs and not return to 
criminal behavior. 
Quotation 2: Well, the drug court is, the way it was originally designed, 
and the way that I think it’s trying to be pushed by the Administrative 
Office of Courts, is that it is an alternative sentencing. And it’s a court of 
last resort. What I mean by that is if I get charged with possession of 
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cocaine, or possession of meth, or even possession of marijuana – because 
we still we still charge people with felony possession of marijuana – those 
people if they’re a first-time offender, they’re not supposed to be in drug 
court, unless they have some type of record or pattern where they need to 
be in drug court. And so if you look at that, why is that? Well, some 
people would say they need to be in drug court because they have a drug 
problem. Well, if you put them in drug court, drug courts are more 
expensive than traditional probation. It’s more expensive than some types 
of unsupervised probation, or even a misdemeanor type plea deal. And 
you’re wasting resources. So you’re adding costs to the criminal justice 
system. And you have someone that normally wouldn’t be in drug court is 
now using these resources for people that we are trying to redirect from 
prison into drug court. Not put extra people into drug court that wouldn’t 
be in prison in the first place. 
Quotation 3: Well, there were problems in the old days with some of the 
ones that were tested out. And it was because sometimes the drug court 
was the only diversion program available to a judge. And it was suggested 
to me several times that let’s say you might have some kid who was 
maybe from a prominent family, who was picked up on drug charges, and 
the judge might say, “Oh, well, we got to put him in the drug court.” Was 
he appropriate for the drug court? Or not? Maybe or maybe not. But it’s 
the only diversion program they’ve got. So sometimes there were some 
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questions about whether or not the people who were being put in the drug 
court were the best people to put there. 
The initial code missing targets was one of the building blocks for the focused 
code missing targets (people, programs, and places). This focused code reflected in part 
the idea that programs can be directed towards the wrong populations, and it was one of 
the building blocks for the Theory of Failure to Hit Targets. The theory is that programs 
directed to the wrong populations result in targets being missed and this serves as an 
obstacle to implementation The through-line for this process would look as follows: 
initial code – missing targets → focused code - missing targets (people, programs, and 
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